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ABSTRACT 
While war in the Arctic appears unlikely at present, this thesis analyzes why an escalation 
of territorial and resource disputes in the Arctic up to and including the use of force 
cannot and should not be ruled out.   This thesis examines the political, economic, and 
military interests of the main Arctic powers—Canada, Denmark, Norway, Russia, and the 
United States—to set the scene for an assessment of the factors that could make for 
cooperation or conflict.   Advocates of a “Pax Arctica” involving regional cooperation 
underrate the more pragmatic and competitive factors underlying international relations 
and the actual limits of international institutions and economic interdependence in 
restraining behavior in an anarchic system. The potential for U.S.-Russian maritime 
conflict in the region is genuine. Based on the methodology established for this analysis, 
it can be reasonably assessed that conflict in the Arctic is likely. No time horizon can be 
determined, however, because much depends on decisions made (or not made) by these 
same Arctic powers in the coming decades.     
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“Launching land wars to seize resources is no longer seen as acceptable, 
but a grab for resources at sea may be a different matter.”   
—Nikolas Gvosdev,  
Professor of National Security Studies,  
U.S. Naval War College1 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
International organizations for peace such as the United Nations were originally 
chartered to prevent the outbreak of conflict by providing channels of dispute mediation 
and adjudication with legally binding authority. In contemporary politics, however, states 
are increasingly appealing to these fora only as a means of legitimizing their right to 
counter a threat militarily and less as an opportunity for conflict mediation and resolution.   
This thesis investigates the hypothesis that international institutions and economic 
interdependence may prove to be insufficient means of threat reduction insofar as U.S. 
relations with Russia in the Arctic are concerned. Since this hypothesis appears to be 
well-founded, it is necessary to explore what types of militarized conflict could be 
expected in the Arctic if diplomacy failed. With this information, more realistic policy 
measures might be implemented to address a shockingly weak U.S. position in Arctic 
matters, including diplomatic, military, and economic issues. While not assigning an 
expected timeframe or event horizon for such an outcome, this thesis seeks to examine 
(a) what factors could increase the risk of a U.S.-Russian maritime conflict in the Arctic, 
and (b) what measures the United States—and the U.S. Navy in particular—might take to 
be prepared for deterrence and defense in such an eventuality.   
For the purposes of the argument at hand, conflict shall be defined as a dispute 
over interests that involves or could involve the threat, display, or use of military or 
police force in the process of its resolution up to, but not including, a formal declaration 
                                                 
1 Nikolas Gvosdev, as quoted by Peter Apps, “Geopolitics, Resources Put Maritime Disputes Back on 
Map,” Reuters, October 1, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/01/us-maritime-disputes-
idUSBRE8900BG20121001.   
 2 
of war. Therefore, when discussing the likelihood of maritime conflict, “war” is explicitly 
not implied. Herein, conflict is also synonymous with a militarized interstate dispute.   
B. IMPORTANCE  
Climate change is dramatically and rapidly transforming the geography of the 
planet, and what was once the subject of legends and myth is becoming reality. As the 
Arctic ice cap has receded, the long sought-after “Northwest Passage” has become more 
easily navigable, opening the path for more cost-effective commercial shipping routes 
and allowing easier exploration for, and exploitation of, natural resources in a formerly 
inhospitable and inaccessible region. Nations bordering the Arctic Ocean will not only 
seek to regulate maritime traffic in their respective territorial waters and economic zones, 
but also to expand their exclusive economic claims in a “maritime land grab” for control 
of the wealth of potential natural resources that are assessed to be located there. The risk 
of conflict in the Arctic has never been greater, and this promises to increase the 
significance of maritime capabilities, including naval forces.   
With respect to the defense of vital national interests, be they issues of 
sovereignty, resources, or influence, it is axiomatic that a responsible and prudent 
government plans and executes strategy, and operates forces, based on assessments of 
capabilities as well as perceived intentions. Measures to counter a potential adversary’s 
capabilities should therefore take priority in policy formulation and implementation. In 
this regard, this thesis analyzes the extent to which the United States and its allies are 
able to address the potential threat posed by Russian Arctic capability.   
Intentions are generally much harder to gauge than capabilities. Strategic 
communications—including public statements by political figures and purposeful actions 
designed to demonstrate resolve—are therefore all the more important as indicators of an 
adversary’s objectives.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
While the United States and Russia (formerly under the flag of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics) have maintained a constant maritime presence in the Arctic 
 3 
region since the Cold War, most activity has been limited to scientific research, 
icebreaking support, and subsurface patrols. With the exception of the latter, the extent of 
the Arctic ice shelf (as it varied minimally from year to year) created a natural northern 
maritime “border” of sorts, and the Arctic Pole, like the Antarctic, assumed a militarily 
neutral status; a ship-on-ship naval battle was highly unlikely, if not impossible, at the 
time due primarily to simple geophysical limitations. There was no interest or reason 
politically to defend any specified lines beyond the ice’s edge. As these natural borders 
recede, however, and underwater resources are discovered and tapped for their economic 
value, political and economic claims—backed by naval presence, capability, and 
historical tensions—increase the likelihood of armed confrontations in this new maritime 
frontier. Moreover, the United States and Russia are not the only stakeholders with a 
legitimate claim to this potential treasure trove. Canada, Denmark (responsible for the 
security of Greenland), and Norway, too, are strategically positioned to play major roles 
in this theater of operations.   
The circular geography of the Arctic leaves these five nations arrayed such that 
multiple disputes remain unsettled to this day. If left unresolved, the risk of low intensity, 
militarized interstate disputes could increase—especially where Russia is concerned. 
While Russia has signed, and thus far observed, accords with both the United States2 and 
Norway3 to delimit overlapping exclusive economic zones (EEZ), the former agreement 
has yet to be ratified by the Russian legislature.4   Such diplomatic ambiguity can, and 
indeed, does, often result in militarized disputes involving economic actors as much as—
or more than—military units. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter II, but suffice 
                                                 
2 United Nations, “Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Maritime Boundary,” June 1, 1990, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/USA-
RUS1990MB.PDF.   
3 United Nations, “Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning 
Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean,” September 15, 2010,  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREATIES/NOR-
RUS2010.PDF. 
4 Ronald O’Rourke, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for 
Congress, June 15, 2012 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2012), 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf, 14. President George H.W. Bush signed the Agreement on 
June 1, 1990 and submitted it to the Senate for ratification on September 26, 1990 as Senate Treaty 
Document 101–22. The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent to ratification on September 16, 1991.   
 4 
it to say that the need to adequately enforce and defend the boundaries established in 
these accords is highlighted by the historical propensity of both Russia and the United 
States to seize, sink, and/or otherwise harass maritime vessels operating in what they 
unilaterally recognizes as their EEZ. A primary example is the on-going dispute between 
Russia and Japan over contested EEZ boundaries and fishing rights in the Sea of Japan.5    
The U.S. Coast Guard, meanwhile, has been involved in several altercations involving 
Russian commercial fishing vessels poaching in the U.S.-claimed waters of the Bering 
Sea.   
It is important to remember that, through the North Atlantic Treaty, the United 
States is committed to mutual defense and cooperation with its Arctic allies, leaving 
Russia alone to defend its interests in the Arctic. The United States is also allied with 
Canada through the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) treaty. While these 
alliances are generally characterized as strong and enduring, territorial disputes between 
members could weaken political solidarity and undermine the ability of these 
organizations to address common external threats. Factors contributing to a potential 
maritime conflict between the United States and Russia will be assessed in isolation and 
in conjunction with U.S. relations with other NATO members. In other words, several 
Arctic disputes that do not directly involve the United States will be considered because 
of their potential to draw in the United States through its NATO ties.   
According to the Correlates of War database,6 maritime disputes over natural 
resources occur frequently in all parts of the world, though escalation to the level of war 
has not been observed and is assessed to be highly unlikely in the future, in any region. 
Cases involving Russia are of primary concern, of course, especially when considering 
the levels of conflict to which the Russians have resorted in maritime disputes in the 
northern Sea of Japan. Due to Russia’s economic dependence on hydrocarbon resources, 
as indicated by the large percentage of its gross domestic product (GDP) derived from oil 
                                                 
5 A related factor is the Russian-Japanese disagreement regarding the sovereignty of the Kuril Islands 
in the same vicinity.   
6 Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer, “MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Dispute Narratives, 
Version 3.0,”  March 25, 2004, 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID_v3.0.narratives.pdf.   
 5 
and gas sales, the Russians place great strategic and national security value on resources 
discovered in the Arctic and will therefore be inclined to defend their claims militarily. 
To that end, the relative sizes and capabilities of the fleets of the Arctic nations are also 
assessed as potential factors in any confrontation in the region.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the literature addressing the importance of the Arctic and areas of 
contention among the Arctic rim nations reveals a significant point of consensus: the 
likelihood of war erupting in the region over resources is virtually nil. Beyond that point 
of agreement, experts differ with respect to the effectiveness of institutional mediation 
and economic interdependence as factors of mitigation against conflict. Analysts arguing 
for the likelihood of cooperation hold that existing international agreements and fora 
provide adequate and sufficient mechanisms for conflict resolution. Meanwhile, other 
scholars maintain that, despite the utility of these institutions and mechanisms, nations 
are nevertheless “hedging” against a failure of diplomacy and increasing their military 
and law enforcement presence in the region in order to defend their claims and national 
interests. In every case, however, Russia is recognized as a “wild card” that tends to 
behave unpredictably and irrationally in achieving its own objectives.   
Katarzyna Zyśk, for example, makes the point that Russia’s “divergent signals, 
sometimes confusing and contradictory, may in themselves [be elements] of a strategy”7    
designed to place the onus of escalation on its opponents, and justifying the need to 
defend its own interests militarily in the face of foreign aggression.   
So far, Russian military ambitions have been more rhetoric than 
reality…Nonetheless, steps towards a radical transformation of the 
defense sector have been taken, and, albeit slowly…in the future, 
strengthened and more accessible military capabilities may contribute to 
create situations where it will be easier to make use of them.8    
                                                 
7 Katarzyna Zyśk, “Russia and the High North: Security and Defense Perspectives,” in Security 
Perspectives in the High North: Geostrategic Thaw or Freeze? NDC Forum Paper 7, ed. Sven G. 
Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2009), 106.   
8 Katarzyna Zyśk, “Russia and the High North,” 123.   
 6 
Echoing this, and other points made by Zyśk, Pavel K. Baev notes, “To a significant 
degree, Moscow appears also to be motivated by unquantifiable but irrationally powerful 
considerations related to international prestige.”9     
On the other hand, advocates of institutionalism, such as Packard C. Trent, argue 
that, while current territorial conflicts involving all of the Arctic nations exist, these 
disputes are either currently being resolved through existing diplomatic means (most 
notably the institutions established through the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS)), or are “not important enough for either nation to go to conflict 
over.”10  Advocates of cooperation are generally unanimous in their assertion that the 
UNCLOS remains the most effective means of conflict arbitration between the Arctic 
nations. As stated in the U.S. “Arctic Regional Policy,” “it give[s participants] a seat at 
the table when the rights that are vital to [their] interests are debated and negotiated.”11  
The UNCLOS allows participants to submit claims based on original scientific data for 
adjudication, and final decisions provide international legitimacy to these claims, thereby 
lowering (if not eliminating) the justification for armed clashes over the issue in the 
future. In summary, Trent notes that Arctic nations are actively engaged in diplomatic 
communication with each other, abiding by international law, and developing “strategies 
that confirm their commitment to cooperation, which reduce the possibility of conflict.”12   
Unfortunately, Trent misinterprets the purpose and powers of the UNCLOS when 
he cites Part VI, Article 76(8) and states that “the recommendation given by the CLCS 
[Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf] ‘shall be final and binding.’”13 
While it is true that the ruling on the claim is final and binding, it is only with respect to 
the legitimacy of the claim, not the final disposition of any disputes. In other words, it 
                                                 
9 Pavel K. Baev, “From West to South to North: Russia Engages and Challenges Its Neighbors,” 
International Journal 63, 2 (Spring 2008): 303, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40204363.   
10 Packard C. Trent, “An Evaluation of the Arctic – Will It Become an Area of Cooperation or 
Conflict?” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2011), 88.    
11 George W. Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 66 and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive/HSPD 25,” January 9, 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm.   
12 Trent, “An Evaluation of the Arctic,” 91.    
13 Ibid., 23.   
 7 
establishes an internationally recognized delineation of rights to claims, but does not 
provide for a final delimitation of territorial boundaries between disputants. Such issues 
must be resolved as a separate diplomatic matter between them or through arbitration.14  
The UNCLOS, therefore, is not a panacea, only a partial solution.   
At the same time, Chad Pate maintains in his graduate thesis that economic 
solutions could increase cooperation and limit the possibility of conflict. Pate proposes 
that increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) between nations increases “pacific” 
behavior—i.e., peaceful cooperation—between the recipient and the investor in an effort 
to maximize profit through their anticipated partnership, and leaves the door open for 
other mutually beneficial partnerships in the future.15 While theoretically plausible, in 
reality, especially with respect to Russia, such outcomes have historically failed to obtain 
in certain cases. The reasons why are discussed in Chapter III.   
While Trent and Pate argue that cooperation among Arctic nations is possible, 
they both acknowledge that Russia’s current policies and actions inhibit other actors—
governments and multinational corporations—from fully trusting that diplomatic and 
economic cooperation will suffice. Russia’s future prosperity is intrinsically tied to its 
hydrocarbon resources, including the vast reserves estimated to be located in the Arctic.   
From a Russian perspective, the very survival of the state depends on controlling as much 
of the natural resources in the region as possible.16  The result has been a ramping up of 
each nation’s military presence in the Arctic—ostensibly to better fulfill their 
constabulary roles in increasingly accessible territorial waters. Realistically, however, the 
NATO powers are acting to balance against Russia’s dominant military presence in the 
region.17  Even Roger Howard, who holds that natural resources are not the only reason 
                                                 
14 See especially UNCLOS, Annex II Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, Article 9: 
The actions [read decisions] of the Commission shall not prejudice matters relating to delimitation of 
boundaries between States with opposite or adjacent coasts. See also UNCLOS Part VI, Article 83 
Delimitation of the continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts, and Part XV 
Settlement of Disputes.   
15 Chad P. Pate, “Easing the Arctic Tension: An Economic Solution” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, December 2010), 68.   
16 Pate, “Easing the Arctic Tension,” 37–52.   
17 Rob Huebert, “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment,” Canadian Defence & Foreign 
Affairs Institute, March 2010.   
 8 
for an arms race in the Arctic, agrees that such a build-up is nevertheless taking place in 
anticipation of increasing vulnerability to attack from this “fourth front.”18    
Indeed, the corpus major of literature on interaction between Arctic governments 
tends to support the notion that, while a peaceful settlement to regional disputes is always 
desired, these same governments are simultaneously preparing to defend their claims 
militarily if necessary. Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow for Russian and Eurasian 
Studies at the Heritage Foundation, advocates “opposing Russia’s territorial claims in the 
Arctic, but…without joining [the] LOST [Law of the Sea Treaty].”19  He is joined by 
Scott Borgerson,20 Fellow for Ocean Governance at the Council on Foreign Relations, 
and by the National Academies21 in urging Congress to increase funding to provide for a 
more robust U.S. military and law enforcement presence in the Arctic.   
Executive-branch policy-makers concur, as previously noted,22 and are pushing 
for an expanded role for the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard in the Arctic. Under the Obama 
administration, the Chief of Naval Operations issued the U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap in 
October 2010 as part of the Navy’s Task Force Climate Change initiative to study the 
effects of global warming on the policy, strategy, force structure, and investments of the 
service in the region.23  Key objectives of the Roadmap include assessing current 
readiness and capabilities for Arctic operations, increasing operational experience 
through high-latitude exercises, promoting cooperative relationships with other federal 
agencies and Arctic nation militaries, and improving environmental data collection and 
prediction capabilities.   
                                                 
18 Roger Howard, “Russia’s New Front Line,” Survival 52, 2 (2010): 141–156, doi: 
10.1080/00396331003764678.   
19 Ariel Cohen, “From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S. Arctic 
Policy,” Backgrounder, No. 2421 (June 15, 2010): 12. LOST is an alternate acronym for the UNCLOS. 
20 Scott G. Borgerson, Statement before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
Washington, D.C., March 25, 2009, 3.   
21 National Research Council, “Summary for Congress,” Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An 
Assessment of U.S. Needs (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2007), 4.   
22 Bush, “National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 66 and Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive/HSPD 25.”   
23 Oceanographer of the Navy, U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap (Washington, DC: Department of the 
Navy, 2010), http://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/USN_artic_roadmap.pdf.   
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Recent press releases and media reports have little to say regarding cooperative 
measures but mostly describe individual countries’ increasing capabilities to defend their 
sovereign territory.24  Hardline rhetoric, combined with provocative actions, has also 
increased tensions over a possible resource war.25  Whereas the “Freedom of the Seas” in 
the Arctic was once a given,26 only the United States has maintained such a position, 
while Russia and Canada in particular have made it clear that major waterways such as 
the “Northern Passage”27 and the “Northwest Passage”28 are their respective territorial 
waters.   
Perhaps Rob Huebert, Fellow of the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs 
Institute, summed it up best:  
Here is the real problem: because each of the Arctic states is in the process 
of rearming “just in case,” they are all contributing to the growing 
strategic value of the region. As this value grows, each state will attach a 
greater value to their own national interests in the region. In this way, an 
arms race may be beginning. And once the weapons systems are in place, 
states can behave in strange ways.29    
It is important to note that Russia’s military leadership continues to view the United 
States (and its NATO allies) as a significant threat to its national security, and that the 
                                                 
24 Mia Bennett, “Russia, Like Other Arctic States, Solidifies Northern Military Presence,” Foreign 
Policy Association, July 4, 2011, http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/07/04/russia-arctic-states-solidifying-
northern-military-presence/.   
25 Associated Press, “Putin says Russia will expand presence in Arctic,” June 30, 2011, 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2011/jun/30/putin-says-russia-will-expand-presence-in-arctic/. And 
also Nataliya Vasilyeva, “Russia, Canada in Rivalry over Arctic Resources,” Associated Press, September 
16, 2010, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/sep/16/russia-canada-in-rivalry-over-arctic-
resources/. And also Associated Press, “Russia to deploy 2 Army Brigades in Arctic,” July 1, 2011, 
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2011/jul/01/russia-to-deploy-2-army-brigades-in-arctic/.   
26 Donat Pharand, “Freedom of the Seas in the Arctic Ocean,” The University of Toronto Law Journal 
19, no. 2 (Spring, 1969): 210–233.   
27 Cohen, “From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access,” 9. The Russians more 
consistently refer to this passage as the “Northern Passage” or “Northern Sea Route.”  For purposes of 
symmetry when discussing it vis-à-vis the Canadian “Northwest Passage,” the alternate term “Northeast 
Passage” is also employed in the literature on the Arctic to refer to this same passage over which Russia 
asserts oversight.   
28 Oran R. Young, “Canada and the United States in the Arctic: Testing the ‘Special Relationship’” 
Northern Perspectives 15, 2 (May-June 1987), http://www.carc.org/pubs/v15no2/2.htm. And also 
“Canadians ‘Support More Troops to Defend Arctic Claims’” BBC News, 25 January, 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12272312.   
29 Huebert, “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment,” 22–23.   
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Russian military maintains “a clear institutional interest in portraying NATO’s 
expansion” as aggressive and menacing.30  
While most authors offer suggestions on ways to mitigate threats and reduce 
tensions, the underlying assumption is that if such steps are not taken, or if disputes 
remain unresolved, conflict is possible. A significant gap in the literature, then, is that, 
despite various acknowledgements that an arms competition may be beginning, there has 
been no thorough analysis conducted regarding its potential consequences, and what 
other factors could spark a militarized confrontation in the Arctic. Navies can be—and 
have been—employed in several degrees of conflict short of war, after all, from shows of 
force to searches and seizures. Efforts by countries to hedge against a failure of 
diplomacy—intentional or not—set the stage for self-fulfilling prophesies.   
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis analyzes an array of independent factors likely to contribute to the 
escalation of a dispute from the diplomatic realm into the military one. In determining the 
likelihood of maritime conflict in the Arctic, six independent variables will be analyzed:  
(1) the degree of economic dependence on hydrocarbon resources in the Arctic 
and elsewhere, assessed as a percentage of GDP (or alternatively, national state budget) 
derived from income from such resources;  
(2) the value of (potentially) contested claims (reflecting the need to defend such 
claims), assessed as the value in U.S. dollars of resource deposits in disputed areas (or 
areas of potential dispute) based on current market prices, and also assessed in terms of 
the political assertions advanced in an effort to secure recognition of claims;  
(3) the ability to defend claims over disputed areas, assessed as a function of 
current or projected maritime capabilities (including platforms designed to operate in 
Arctic conditions), and taking into account the geographic location and area of respective 
Arctic claims;  
                                                 
30 William D. Jackson, “Encircled Again: Russia’s Military Assesses Threats in a Post-Soviet World,” 
Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 3 (Autumn 2002): 379. 
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(4) the historical propensity for militarized conflict, assessed by the frequency of 
past (maritime) conflicts over natural resources;   
(5) the role of international institutions, assessed in terms of success in mitigating 
maritime conflicts (i.e., preventing escalation or promoting a peaceful resolution of 
disputes);   
(6) the economic interdependence, assessed as a percentage of GDP of foreign 
direct investment, with due attention to the obstacles to increased interdependence. 
The historical propensity for militarized conflict is a primary factor in assessing 
the likelihood of future conflict. Disputes involving Russia are of primary concern, while 
those involving other nations will also be considered as a reflection of the value placed 
on such commodities and issues and the country’s willingness to defend them militarily.   
In the conclusion of this thesis, these variables are assessed based on the 
arguments presented herein and assigned a value reflecting the significance of that factor 
in increasing the likelihood of conflict on an ordinal scale of HIGH (2), MEDIUM (1), 
and LOW (0), except in the cases of the role of international institutions and the degree of 
economic interdependence, where the values assigned are reversed (i.e., LOW = 2, 
MEDIUM = 1, and HIGH = 0). Russia and the United States are scored separately. 
However, where the effects of alliances or other external security interests are concerned, 
such values are marked with an asterisk (*) indicating that this score is higher than it 
would be if the impact of a particular variable on a country were considered in isolation. 
The higher the cumulative value of all the variables, the higher the likelihood that conflict 
in the Arctic will occur.   The maximum score possible, therefore, is 24, indicating that 
the potential for conflict in the Arctic is extremely likely. The minimum score possible is 
0, indicating that there is no possibility of conflict in the Arctic. Table 1 provides a 





SCORE LIKELIHOOD OF CONFLICT 





0–4 Extremely Unlikely 
 
Table 1.   Aerandir Conflict Assessment Matrix. The likelihood of maritime conflict 
in the arctic, assessed as a cumulative score of six factors. Values are assigned (see 
Table 2, Aerandir Conflict Assessment Index) and likelihood is assessed in 
the conclusion. 
Ultimately, this is an analytically subjective, vice statistically objective, 
measurement—a forecast based on informed judgments about historical trends. The goal 
of this thesis, therefore, is to underpin this subjective judgment with objective facts and 
logical arguments in support of such an analysis.   
Primary sources analyzed in this thesis consist of treaty and governmental policy 
documents, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, bilateral 
accords of territorial demarcation, the “Arctic strategies” of the respective Arctic powers 
and related political statements, and charters and declarations of international 
organizations such as NATO and the Arctic Council.   Additionally, empirical support for 
case studies is drawn from the Correlates of War database on Militarized Interstate 
Disputes, assessments and order-of-battle tabulations by Information Handling Services 
(IHS) Jane’s Information Group, data compiled by the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank, and CIA Factbook economic data reports.   
Secondary sources discussing the economic, political, and military impact of the 
melting Arctic ice cap, including articles by Arctic experts and scholars, think tank 
reports, academic theses, and assessments by the Congressional Research Service of the 
Library of Congress, are analyzed to provide background, context, and insight into the 
objectives, intentions, and actions of the Arctic states. Finally, media reports and 
commentaries supplement these primary and secondary sources by filling in information 
gaps and providing further context on public perceptions of Arctic matters which can 
influence policy-makers’ decision calculi.   
 13 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
In order to assess the likelihood of conflict in the Arctic, it is first necessary to 
pinpoint the underlying geopolitical factors that are contributing to its continuing 
militarization.   
Chapter II seeks to identify the threats to U.S., allied, and Russian interests in this 
region. In this respect, geography, geology, politics, and economics are all contributing to 
an Arctic arms race for access to resources (discovered and potential), routes, and 
recognition. Here, capability, opportunity, and intent come together to delineate the 
contours of the threat to Arctic nations.   
Chapter III investigates factors that may help mitigate against militarized 
interstate disputes in the region but also exposes myths in the belief that such factors are 
panaceas for conflict. These factors may, in fact, only serve to delay, but not prevent, 
eventual maritime confrontations. Expanding on this line of argument, this chapter also 
explores how, in the fog before war, an otherwise banal event could quickly escalate into 
a political power play between navies in the presence of historical mistrust, a perception 
of vulnerability, and nationalist sentiment.   
Chapter IV addresses the risks and stakes of this Arctic arms race, arguing that, in 
the final analysis, military might will determine who can, ultimately, not only claim, but 
also secure, access, and maintain sovereignty over the territory and treasure of the Arctic. 
Finally, this chapter also analyzes the threat equation and concludes with a subjective 
assessment of the likelihood of maritime conflict in the Arctic and policy 
recommendations for meeting the challenges of a militarized northern front.   
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II. IDENTIFYING THE THREAT 
“Notwithstanding the public statements of peace and co-operation in the 
Arctic issued by the Arctic states, the strategic value of the region is 
growing. As this value grows, each state will attach a greater value to 
their own national interests in the region. The Arctic states may be talking 
co-operation, but they are preparing for conflict.” 
—Rob Huebert, 
Professor of Political Science, 
University of Calgary31 
 
When key decision-makers seek to understand and interpret world events and the 
actions of their neighbors and competitors, perception is everything.  Whether one is 
more liberally inclined to take someone at his word or is more of a realist, for whom 
actions speak louder than words, any inconsistency between the two—words and 
actions—raises suspicion of another’s intent or objectives. Such suspicion often clouds 
the decision-making calculus by forcing policy-makers to rely on biased perceptions, 
previous experiences, personal ideology, and a whole host of other subjective means to 
compensate for what their objective reasoning and sensors cannot resolve. If the 
conclusions of their decision-making process lead to perception of a threat, then the 
potential for conflict increases. Depending on the magnitude of ambiguous input into this 
process (for present purposes, the disparity between words and actions), the potential for 
a miscalculation of the threat also increases, and presents the opportunity for a conflict of 
interests to escalate into a conflict of arms.   
In this chapter, factors contributing to an increased threat perception in Arctic 
affairs are analyzed and assessed. These factors include the increased opportunity for 
conflict, the increased capability to engage in conflict, and the increasing perception of 
intent to engage in conflict if national interests are flouted. Such national interests, as 
concerns the Arctic states, include Russia’s increasing reliance on hydrocarbon resources 
as a source of political and economic strength and stability, disputed areas of potential 
                                                 
31 Rob Huebert, “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment,” Canadian Defence & Foreign 
Affairs Institute (March 2010), 
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf, iv.   
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hydrocarbon resources in this region, and associated issues of prestige and sovereignty as 
manifested in political rhetoric and behavior. According to a 2008 National Intelligence 
Estimate, “Climate change is unlikely to trigger interstate war, but it could lead to 
increasingly heated interstate recriminations and possibly to low-level armed conflicts”32 
as “perceptions of energy scarcity…drive countries to take actions to assure their future 
access to energy supplies. In the worst case this could lead to interstate conflicts if 
government leaders deem assured access to energy resources to be essential to 
maintaining domestic stability and the survival of the regime.”33  
A. WHY NOW? 
In 1984, Simon Ollivant published a short, comprehensive study on the rising 
geostrategic importance of the High North entitled “Arctic Challenge to NATO.”  At a 
time when military technological innovation was at its Cold War peak, Ollivant examined 
the potential for armed conflict in and over what was previously a region at the margins 
of both the earth and political awareness: inhospitable and barren, a no-man’s land of 
seemingly inconsequential value to great superpowers and lesser bandwagoners alike. 
Analyzing the effects of the latest developments in military technology, force 
dispositions, and resource and sovereignty claims on the military stability of the region, 
Ollivant concluded that the greatest dangers to NATO unity were an unbalanced 
American hegemony in the region and increased political conflict among allied members 
over contested economic interests in the region.34   
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, of course, a great deal has changed in the 
world of international relations. The frozen tensions and balances of the bi-polar Cold 
War have melted into a dynamic maelstrom of multi-polar politics.   While the reasons 
for interest in the Arctic have changed, ceteris paribus, the dangers to NATO remain 
                                                 
32 National Intelligence Council, “Growing Potential for Conflict,” Global Trends 2025: A 
Transformed World (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008), 
http://www.aicpa.org/research/cpahorizons2025/globalforces/downloadabledocuments/globaltrends.pdf, 
66.    
33 Ibid., 63.   
34 Simon Ollivant, “Arctic Challenge to NATO,” in Conflict Studies 172 (London: The Institute for the 
Study of Conflict, 1984), 20–21.   
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practically the same as those identified during the Cold War by Ollivant, if not more 
salient. Just as climate change is breaking up the ice in the North, regional territorial 
disputes, formerly manageable owing to the existential threat of nuclear Armageddon, 
now have the potential to divide and weaken the integrity of the alliance. Meanwhile, 
whereas American hegemonic policy in allied affairs can now be considered a sub-set of 
the aforementioned danger, it is now Russian hegemony in the Arctic that may serve as a 
truer test of NATO cohesion and military capability, depending on Moscow’s choices.   
At the same time, the substance of the threat has indeed changed: while the 
potential for global thermonuclear war has continued to linger on in international affairs 
and military readiness, tensions associated with military maneuvers in the Arctic have 
become more conventional in nature. In the intervening twenty years, other interests have 
also emerged which have made this region, once again, a potential battleground among 
old rivals. In the twenty-first century, a force even more powerful than the nuclear 
weapon—nature—has become the catalyst of international competition, opening the 
Arctic up to exploitation in previously impractical, if not impossible, ways.     
B. OPPORTUNITY 
Whatever the causes of the shrinking Arctic ice cap, the fact remains that it is 
occurring—and not at a glacial pace. Since measurements were first routinely recorded in 
1979 (the satellite record), the long-term trend in the extent of the northern cryosphere 
has been an absolute decline in total September ice extent of approximately 13 percent 
per decade, despite periodic short-term increases in “new ice,” which melts just as easily 
as it forms (see Figure 1).35  On the upside, such ice is easier to break and navigate for 
the purposes of shipping in the region, but in the long-term, the global environmental 
impacts are just beginning to be understood. In the fast-paced, interconnected era of the 
twenty-first century, governments are becoming increasingly vigorous in their policies 
and actions, with little patience for long-term solutions or studies. Arctic governments 
                                                 
35 Katherine Leitzell, “Is Arctic Sea Ice Back to Normal?” Arctic Ice News and Analysis, National 
Snow and Ice Data Center, May 29, 2012, http://nsidc.org/icelights/2012/05/29/is-arctic-sea-ice-back-to-
normal/. Also, National Snow and Ice Data Center, “Arctic Ice 101,” http://nsidc.org/icelights/arctic-sea-
ice/.   
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and economic entities alike are scrambling to take advantage of this phenomenon to 
exploit natural resources and maritime routes that have been locked away for eons.   
 
 
Figure 1.   Decline in Sea Ice Extent, September 1979 to 201236 
While the Arctic ice has been receding gradually, it has only been in the last 
decade that the imminent possibility of an ice-free season has attracted the serious 
attention of policy-makers and economic interests. In 2007, the summer ice minimum 
receded to such an extent that by September, for the first time in the satellite record, the 
Northwest Passage was completely navigable for regular ocean-going vessels.37  It is 
currently estimated that the Arctic Ocean could experience an ice-free summer season as 
soon as 203038 or even 2015, according to interpretations of other models;39 however, the 
changing dynamics of year-to-year climatology in the region make a more certain and 
precise estimate untenable. Regardless, the certainty that the Northwest Passage will be 
open soon—that is to say, within the next 10 to 20 years—presents a tantalizing 
                                                 
36 National Snow and Ice Data Center, “Sea Ice Trends in Extent,” 
ftp://sidads.colorado.edu/DATASETS/NOAA/G02135/Sep/N_09_plot.png.   
37 National Snow and Ice Data Center, “Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows,” 
http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001_pressrelease.html.   
38 Ibid.   
39 Frédéric Lassere, “High North Shipping: Myths and Realities,” in Security Perspectives in the High 
North: Geostrategic Thaw or Freeze? NDC Forum Paper 7, Ed. Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-
Windsor (Rome: NATO Defense College, 2009), 180.   
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opportunity for those who are able to take advantage of it: specifically, hydrocarbon and 
mineral extraction enterprises and commercial shipping ventures.   
As mentioned earlier, the weaker new and first-year ice is readily broken by 
icebreakers, making navigation and exploration easier than ever. As the ice continues to 
recede from the coastline and becomes thinner, off-shore drilling platforms will become a 
more feasible method of extraction in the region, tapping into potential reserves estimated 
to account for 22 percent of the world’s “undiscovered, technically recoverable” 
hydrocarbon energy supply.40  This is also aided by the ability of transport and supply 
vessels to more easily operate, at times even unassisted, between northern ports and these 
off-shore platforms. Ultimately, though, as noted by Timo Koivurova and Kamrul 
Hossain of the Arctic Centre, it has been the increasing demand for, and reliably high-
price of, oil and gas over the past decade that has finally made such exploration and 
extraction economically viable.41   
Another economic benefit of the receding northern cryosphere is the seasonal 
opening of the Northwest and Northeast Passages for long-haul commercial shipping. 
When ice-free navigation is possible, shipping distances between Europe and Asia could 
decrease by 3,000 to 10,000 km compared to current routes via the Panama and Suez 
canals.42  According to an estimate by the Heritage Foundation, “using the Northeast 
Passage along the Russian coast reduces a trip from Hamburg to Shanghai by almost 
4,000 miles, cuts a week off delivery times, and saves approximately $650,000 in fuel 
costs per ship.”43  Not only do these new routes significantly decrease delivery times, 
they also stand save companies millions (if not billions) of dollars annually in associated 
logistics costs.   
                                                 
40 U.S. Geological Survey, “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of Natural Gas 
Assessed in the Arctic,” July 23, 2008, http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1980.   
41 Timo Koivurova and Kamrul Hossain, Offshore Hydrocarbon: Current Policy Context in the 
Marine Arctic, Arctic Transform Program, September 4, 2008, http://arctic-
transform.org/download/OffHydBP.pdf, 6.   
42 Lassere, “High North Shipping: Myths and Realities,” 192–194.   
43 Luke Coffey, “NATO in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities,” Issue Brief No. 3646, June 22, 
2012, The Heritage Foundation, http://report.heritage.org/ib3646, 1.   
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There are, however, several important caveats to note when considering economic 
activity in the High North. Firstly, in addition to the hazards presented by disintegrating 
ice floes, due to the high degree of seasonal variability in ice coverage from year-to-year 
neither the temporal nor the spatial availability of a reliant, ice-free corridor can be 
predicted, even with current technology and computing models.44  This unpredictability 
is not conducive to the needs of routine shipping, even on a seasonal basis. Secondly, and 
for this reason, a distinction must be made between container and bulk shipping. As 
Frédéric Laserre points out, the former are bound to tight delivery schedules, with 
multiple intermediate deliveries being made en route to maximize the cost-effectiveness 
of their shipments.45  Bulk shipments of agricultural goods and natural resources are less 
bound to such considerations and are therefore a likely sector that will take advantage of 
an opening Arctic. Thirdly, the distance savings applies mostly to shipments made to and 
from more northern ports: the farther south either port is, the less likely that an Arctic 
route will offer an economic advantage.46 Fourth, the extreme Arctic climate still 
presents a harsh operating environment for workers who would be exposed to the 
elements. Constructing, operating, and maintaining extraction platforms in rough seas 
and high winds is difficult enough, but the extreme cold temperatures in the Arctic pose 
hazards to man and machine alike. In the final analysis, however, the consensus is that 
the ice caps will continue to recede annually in absolute terms and ice-free summers will 
eventually obtain. Political leaders and corporate executives should begin planning to 
exploit this eventuality now, lest they be left scrambling at the gates when they do open 
for business, however seasonally.   
Taken on a country-by-country basis, the economic opportunities provided by the 
receding ice caps provide powerful motivators for action in securing and exploiting 
Arctic resources as soon as possible. Unfortunately, the geopolitical nature of the Arctic 
 
 
                                                 
44 Lassere, “High North Shipping: Myths and Realities,” 194.   
45 Ibid., 196. 
46 Ibid., 194.   
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does not permit such an isolated context when framing policy objectives. In reality, the 
melting ice caps also expose anxiety and fears over economic encroachment – or 
overreach.    
1. Staking Claims 
According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas 
(UNCLOS),47 countries are entitled to exclusive economic zones (EEZ) out to 200 
nautical miles (nm) from their territorial baselines. Any claims beyond this limit are 
termed “excessive” but may be recognized after a country submits proof that such claims 
are justified according to the provisions established in the UNCLOS and adjudicated by 
committee. Part VI of the UNCLOS establishes the criteria under which Parties (ratified 
signatories) may make “excessive” claims to exclusively exploit the resources of the 
seabed and subsoil (but not the water column or airspace above it) beyond the 200 nm 
EEZ. The claims may not exceed an additional 150 nm from the EEZ or 100 nm beyond 
the point where the depth of the water is 2,500 meters, whichever is greater. In order to 
validate these claims, extensive research must be conducted to map the hydrography, 
probe the geology, and survey the geodesy of the Arctic. Evidence to support one’s claim 
must then be submitted to a Commission established under Annex II of the UNCLOS for 
adjudication, and all decisions reached are final and binding on all Parties in the dispute. 
Finally, it is important to note that time is of the essence: a nation has only ten years from 
the day it ratifies the UNCLOS to submit claims in excess of its respective EEZ for 
adjudication. In certain areas of the Arctic, the race is on to meet this deadline. 
2. Disputed Areas  
As of this writing, there are five outstanding territorial disputes among Arctic 
nations. Each has the potential to lead to some level of conflict if not resolved peacefully 
though existing mechanisms or otherwise binding agreements. Four of the five would 
                                                 
47 As of this writing, the United States remains the only Arctic nation that is not a ratified signatory to 
this convention. While the United States has signed the treaty and adheres to most of its provisions as a 
matter of customary law, final and binding ratification remains the subject of controversy in the U.S. 
Senate. United Nations, “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” December 10, 1982, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.   
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involve the United States and Russia directly or indirectly. Put differently, there are 
several continuing points of contention between Russia and non-U.S. NATO allies that, if 
diplomacy failed, could bring the United States into a conflict. While the countries 
involved in these disputes are largely resolved to pursue diplomatic solutions, the process 
of negotiation and arbitration could take several years. In the meantime, concerns over 
prestige, sovereignty, and/or the long-term economic implications of an unfavorable 
finding provide ample motive for countries to establish de facto jurisdiction or simply 
squatter’s rights over particular claims through military presence or economic 
development in these disputed areas.   
a. The Lomonosov Ridge – Canada, Denmark, and Russia 
Perhaps the most hotly contested area in the Arctic at present is the 
Lomonosov Ridge: an underwater mountain chain that extends across the Arctic Ocean 
for over 900 nm48 from the New Siberian Islands off the north central coast of Russia to 
Ellesmere Island in the Canadian Archipelago (see Figure 2). The governments of 
Canada, Denmark, and Russia are all in a position to stake a claim to the area, provided 
they can present sufficient evidence to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS) that the Lomonosov Ridge is, indeed, a geological extension of their 
respective continental shelves.   
                                                 
48 Converted from kilometers. Cited measure is approximate and derived from specifications provided 
by GlobalSecurity.org, “Arctic Ocean,” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/arctic.htm.   
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Figure 2.   Territories and Claims within the Arctic Circle49 
In 2001, Russia became the first nation to submit a claim to the CLCS. 
Along with three other areas, the Russian delegation attempted to establish the outer 
limits of its continental shelf in excess of its 200 nm EEZ in the Arctic Ocean. 
Ultimately, the committee withheld approval of Russia’s Arctic claims, asking the 
delegation to provide more substantive, original data to support them.50  Thus from 2007 
                                                 
49 Image credit: IBRU, Durham University, taken from The Economist, “The Scramble for the Seabed: 
Suddenly, a Wider World below the Waterline,” May 14, 2009, 
http://www.economist.com/node/13649265.   
50 Ariel Cohen, “Russia in the Arctic: Challenges to U.S. Energy and Geopolitics in the High North,” 
in Russia in the Arctic, ed. Stephen J. Blank (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2011), 6.   
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to 2011, a Russian scientific expedition travelled to the ridge to collect soil samples to 
satisfy the commission’s requirements. In July 2011, Russian Deputy Prime Minister 
Sergei Ivanov announced that his country intended to submit its findings to the CLCS 
later the following year.51   
In total, Russia stands to obtain rights over approximately five billion tons 
of fuel equivalent, according to the Russian Minister of Natural Resources, Yury 
Trutnev.52  At a rate of approximately $100 per barrel, this equates to a potential revenue 
of $350 trillion over the life of such deposits. The United States Geological Survey 
estimates that the probability of finding at least one hydrocarbon field with recoverable 
resources of at least 50 million barrels of oil equivalent in the vicinity of the Lomonosov 
Ridge is less than 30 percent (see Figure 3) and estimates that there is likely only about 
2.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent in that area (vice the approximately 35 billion barrels 
in the Russian estimate).53   
Nevertheless, according to Dmitry Medvedev, then the Russian President, 
the sale of Arctic resources alone already “accounts for around 20 percent of Russia’s 
gross domestic product and 22 percent of [its] national exports.”54  As the oil and gas 
deposits of western Siberia shrink over the next fifteen years, Moscow will be forced to 
rely increasingly on the potential reserves in the Arctic to compensate for this loss and 
stabilize the dynamics of its intractable reliance on hydrocarbon resources to fund its 
                                                 
51 Thomas Grove, “Russia to Submit U.N. Arctic Claim Next Year,” Reuters, July 7, 2011, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/07/us-russia-arctic-claim-idUSTRE76528320110707. As of this 
writing, Russia has not yet submitted its new findings.   
52 RIA Novosti, “Lomonosov Ridge Could Bring Russia 5 Billion Tons of Extra Fuel,” October 4, 
2007, http://www.energy-
daily.com/reports/Lomonosov_Ridge_Could_Bring_Russia_5_Billion_Tons_Of_Extra_Fuel_999.html.   
53 Kenneth J. Bird, et al., “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas 
North of the Arctic Circle,” U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008–3049 (2008), 
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/, 4. Conversion of metric tons to barrels (1 MT = 7 barrels) is derived 
from the formula provided by Robert Fogt at 
http://www.onlineconversion.com/forum/forum_1058197476.htm and should be regarded as an 
approximate measure.   
54 Dmitry Medvedev, “Speech at Meeting of the Russian Security Council on Protecting Russia’s 
National Interests in the Arctic,” the Kremlin, September 17, 2008, 
http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/09/17/1945_type82912type82913_206564.shtml.   
 25 
national security and government operations.55  This dynamic serves as a significant 
driver of Moscow’s motivation to press for as large a territorial claim in the Arctic as 
possible. This is further discussed in this chapter in the section on intent.   
 
 
Figure 3.   Assessment Units (AUs) in the Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal (CARA). 
Color-coded by assessed probability of the presence of at least one 
undiscovered oil and/or gas field with recoverable resources greater than 50 
million barrels of oil equivalent (MBOE). Probabilities are based on the 
entire area of the AU, including any parts south of the Arctic Circle.56 
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56 Image Credit: USGS, Bird, et al., “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal,” 2.   
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Canada and Denmark, meanwhile, embarked on a joint venture starting in 
2011 to survey, map, and collect pertinent data to support their respective claims to the 
CLCS that the Lomonosov Ridge is rather an extension of the North American 
continental shelf. Canada has until November 2013 to submit its claims, while Denmark 
has until November 2014.57   
It is important to note that, while the CLCS can rule on the validity of 
submitted claims, it does not arbitrate among competing claims. Therefore, regardless of 
whether the Lomonosov Ridge is found to belong to everyone or no one, delimitation of 
boundaries in overlapping areas must be accomplished via a separate treaty or other 
agreement between the nations in dispute (UNCLOS, Part XV). The CLCS determination 
simply provides international recognition of, and validity to, claims when they are taken 
to the negotiation table. The ramifications of this procedural disconnect are discussed in a 
later section of this chapter on intent. For present purposes, it should be noted that the 
Lomonosov Ridge will likely be divided among the claimants. Who gets how much, 
however, will likely come down to squatter’s rights. As Trent points out, until a final 
agreement is reached, “these countries would have to either cooperate and jointly extract 
the resources in the disputed areas or extract the resources with complete disregard to the 
other nations, which would create conflict between them.”58   
It is evident that Russia views the Arctic scramble in broader terms than 
pure economics. At the same meeting in which Ivanov announced the Kremlin’s intent to 
submit its findings to the CLCS, high-level defense officials pointed to threats from an 
expansionist NATO in the Arctic region and vowed to “counter potential threats to its 
energy and mineral interests in the region through the creation of two brigades of Arctic 
troops.”59  Thus, while Russia seeks to resolve this dispute peacefully as a reasonable 
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first step,60 it is simultaneously signaling its intent to defend its claims militarily if the 
resolution is not acceptable to Russia’s interests. If Russia were to challenge Canadian or 
Danish claims or presence militarily, the United States could become involved as well as 
both an ally and an Arctic power.   
b. The Bering Strait – Russia and the United States 
The boundary between Russia and the United States in the Bering Strait 
was negotiated between the two countries as the Soviet Union was collapsing (see Figure 
4). As previously noted in Chapter I, while the treaty was subsequently ratified by the 
U.S. Senate, the Russian Duma has yet to reciprocate—and thereby make the boundary 
official. The primary concern on the Russian part is a perception that the United States 
got a better deal than Russia. According to Vlad Kaczynski, “Although both countries 
ceded territory from their previous claims, the U.S. still controlled a far greater amount of 
area in the Bering Sea than if the new agreement been based on the equidistant line 
principle normally used in international boundary disputes.”61   As a result, the United 
States secured control over more potential natural resources in the area than Russia, 
including oil, gas, and fisheries, not to mention more room to maneuver for its 
submarines.62     
Presently, both countries continue to politically abide by the terms of the 
agreement, but economic interests continue to violate it, especially Russian fishing 
trawlers entering U.S. waters, leading to several incidents of low-level conflict. For 
example, on August 15, 1997, the Russian fishing trawler Chernyayevo was caught 
poaching in U.S. waters by the U.S. Coast Guard. The ship was boarded, seized, and the 
crew arrested and taken to Kodiak island for trial. In December of that year, they were 
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released after paying a heavy fine.63  Again in August 1999, the U.S. Coast Guard 
boarded another Russian fishing trawler Gissar for poaching but the boarding party was 
forcibly removed when several other Russian fishing trawlers surrounded them.64   
Kaczynski notes that “the belligerence of Russian fishing vessels towards U.S. 
enforcement efforts continues to increase…The situation has become so enflamed that 
the U.S. is contemplating using naval gunfire, in the form of warning and disabling shots, 
against non-compliant vessels. Such a resort to violence may only further destabilize the 
situation.”65  Unfortunately, until the two countries can come to an agreement, the 
potential for conflict will remain.   
 
 
Figure 4.   U.S.-Russian Maritime Boundary and Exclusive Economic Zones66 
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c. The Beaufort Sea – Canada and the United States 
Farther North, two NATO and NORAD allies have long-standing disputes 
of their own. On the economic front, the Beaufort Sea dispute involves a 6250 nm
2
 
wedge of water space off the coast of Alaska and the Yukon Territory (see Figure 5). 
Essentially, the disagreement that created this area arises from how the two countries 
extend their border from the land into the sea. Canada maintains that the land border 
between Alaska and the Yukon Territory constitutes the corresponding prolongation of 
the land border (along the 141
°
W) into the Beaufort Sea out to the 200 nm EEZ limit. 
Meanwhile, the U.S. asserts that the border is established by an equidistant line from the 
coast where the two states meet.67   
 
 
Figure 5.   Area of Disputed U.S. and Canadian Claims in the Beaufort Sea68 
Meanwhile, both countries continue to pursue exploratory operations in 
the Beaufort Sea in an attempt to locate—and ultimately exploit—any potential 
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hydrocarbons in their respective jurisdictions. Both countries have auctioned licenses for 
exploration in the disputed area; however, Canada has simultaneously issued work 
prohibition orders on lots in this vicinity (see Figure 6). U.S. attempts to lease lots, 
meanwhile, have failed to attract any bids, “reportedly because oil companies were 
concerned about the legal uncertainty associated with the unresolved boundary.”69  These 
attempts, therefore, have not resulted in any reaction beyond diplomatic demarches, and 
the area remains relatively undeveloped by both parties.   
In isolation, this territorial dispute is unlikely to lead to any significant 
altercations between the two states, and Russia has no stake in the issue. As Baker and 
Byers point out, there are indications that Canada is willing to seek an agreeable 
compromise with the United States over the issue, and that from an economic viewpoint, 
concessions would result in negligible financial losses to either side owing to other 
existing agreements and policies.70 Indeed, these two allies have a strong legacy of 
cooperation and teamwork in the Arctic, and a joint venture in the disputed area is a 
likely interim solution while a final agreement is negotiated. But, as with the Bering Sea 
dispute, as long as the issue remains unsettled, there is a potential for future conflict over 
its prospective and known resources, especially when challenged in the context of a more 
sensitive and emotionally-charged issue in U.S.-Canadian relations.   
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Figure 6.   Canadian Oil and Gas Exploration and Exploitation Lots in the 
Beaufort Sea71 
d. The Northwest Passage – Canada and the United States 
On the political front, the status of the Northwest Passage (see Figure 7) 
remains a point of sharp contention between Canada and the United States. The issue 
centers exclusively on the two countries’ differing recognition of the straits through the 
Canadian Arctic archipelago. When the straits were covered with ice, the difference went 
relatively unnoticed, but two incidents in particular brought the dispute to the forefront of 
political posturing between the two countries, inflaming deep concerns over sovereignty 
on the part of Canada, and a negative precedent for freedom of navigation on the part of 
the United States.   
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Figure 7.   The Northwest Passage (Red/Bottom) and Northeast Passage (Green/Top)72 
In an attempt to test whether the Northwest Passage could be utilized by 
commercial traffic, the SS Manhattan, an ice-strengthened American super-tanker, and an 
escort icebreaker, USCGC Northwind, ventured into the ice-packed strait in 1969 without 
notifying the Canadian government in advance, though Canada subsequently “grant[ed] 
permission anyway.”73  At the time, Canada only claimed a 3 nm territorial water limit, 
and therefore, a corridor through the islands existed that did not fall under Canadian 
jurisdiction. This voyage, while unsuccessful, provoked a fear among Canadians that “a 
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practice [of using the Canadian archipelago] for navigation may evolve among states”74 
and open up the True North to all the hazards associated with such commercial activity, 
especially pollution. 
Rather than being viewed as an opportunity for bilateral cooperation and 
exploration of the Passage, the first voyage of the Manhattan became a 
watershed for the formal declaration of Canada’s right of ownership of the 
Passage. Shortly after the first voyage, the Canadian government unveiled 
its plan to pass pollution legislation specifically for the Arctic in its Speech 
from the Throne, dated 23 October 1969. This legislation, along with other 
strategies, was intended to exercise functional sovereign control over the 
Passage.75   
When the Manhattan encountered severe Canadian restrictions on its movements during 
a second attempt, the United States responded by reaffirming its position that the 
Northwest Passage was an international strait, cutting oil imports from Canada by 20 
percent, and authorizing the construction of the USCGC Polar Sea, “the most powerful 
non-nuclear icebreaker in the world.”76    
In 1985, the USCGC Polar Sea was dispatched by the United States 
government on a “freedom of navigation” mission through the Northwest Passage. As 
such, the U.S. Government did not give prior notification to the Canadian authorities, but 
rather merely informed them that the cruise was taking place and specified its explicit 
purpose. The Canadians reiterated their policy regarding the Northwest Passage, but 
retroactively provided permission and offered assistance to the ship.77  
The resulting political agitation had two relevant consequences. The first 
was the Canadian issuance of the “Territorial Sea Geographical Co-ordinates (Area 7) 
Order of 10 September 1985,” (see Figure 8) which drew contentious straight baselines 
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around Canada.78  The United States and the European Community (EC) both 
immediately protested these “excessive baselines” which effectively enclosed the 
Northwest Passage within their limits and made it an internal Canadian waterway. 79  
Secondly, the United States and Canada eventually signed an “Agreement on Arctic 
Cooperation” in 1988 which essentially codified the existing deadlock in the status of the 
Northwest Passage while allowing both nations to continue utilizing the area: the United 
States promised to always ask for permission to enter waters claimed by Canada, Canada 
agreed to always grant permission to the United States, and nothing about the agreement 
was to be construed as an abandonment of their respective positions regarding the status 
of the strait.80   
 
Figure 8.   Canadian Baselines Enclosing Its Archipelagic Waters81 
Today, Canada continues to assert that the various waterways that make 
up the Northwest Passage are internal waters, and therefore subject to the exclusive 
authority and sovereign rights of Canada. The government of Canada has claimed since at 
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least 1969 that they are “historic internal waters.” According to Michael Byers and 
Suzanne Lalonde, “Under international law, a country may validly claim title over waters 
on historic grounds if it can show that it has, for a considerable length of time, effectively 
exercised its exclusive authority over the maritime area in question. In addition, it must 
show that, during the same period of time, other countries, especially those directly 
affected by the exercise of authority, have acquiesced in it.”82  As Byers and Lalonde go 
on to note, however,  
Even if Canada has effectively exercised its exclusive authority over the 
maritime area claimed, it still has to satisfy the acquiescence criterion.  
[Donat] Pharand considers this to be a fatal flaw in Canada’s historic 
waters argument, for none of the early activity was coupled with an 
explicit claim to the straits and channels between the islands, while the 
United States opposed later explicit expressions of the claim.83   
The United States and the European Union (EU) maintain that the 
Northwest Passage constitutes an international strait connecting two high seas. This 
means that foreign-flagged ships are entitled to transit passage through such waters 
without providing advance notice to the state regulating them. As the transits of the SS 
Manhattan and USCGC Polar Sea demonstrate, the United States has attempted to 
exercise its right to freedom of navigation and thereby established that the requisite 
opinio juris84 does not exist to support Canada’s claims. As the straits become open to 
navigable traffic on a more routine basis, other states will also likely seek to utilize the 
Northwest Passage for transit and further undermine Canada’s case.   
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So what is at stake here?  If the Northwest Passage were recognized as 
internal waters, the ability of the United States to exercise freedom of navigation in other 
parts of the world, most importantly in the Strait of Hormuz, could be undermined by 
such a precedent in international law. This would jeopardize its “strategic mobility” as 
well as subject its economic interests to increased logistic costs and uncertainty.85  Byers 
and Lalonde respond that such worries are “misplaced” and over-inflated,86 but the 
“freedom of the seas” argument remains highly persuasive to senior government officials 
in the United States all the same. For Canada, uncontrolled transit passage through the 
area would not just be a blow to the pride and nationalism that Canadians have invested 
in the cause of Canadian Arctic sovereignty and “territorial” integrity. More 
pragmatically, uncontrolled transit passage could also result in significant increases in 
expenditures for regulation and law enforcement, not to mention the environmental 
impact it would have on the highly fragile ecosystem and the way of life of the Arctic’s 
indigenous population.   
At present, neither side is willing to give, though domestic interest in the 
question in the United States is nowhere near the level noted in Canada. Thus, the 
Canadian government is under tremendous domestic pressure to secure a resolution to the 
issue on Canadian terms. Stephen Harper, the Prime Minister of Canada since 2006, 
made the Arctic a key election campaign issue, and since his installment, he has carried 
through on a number of policies to better secure Canada’s sovereignty over the Arctic. In 
addition to expanding the Canadian military and law enforcement presence in the Arctic, 
his government is committed to developing the infrastructure in the region to support it.87  
Parliamentarians, meanwhile, have even gone so far as to propose changing the name of 
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attach an official Canadian identity to it, a motion supported by all parties, including the 
opposition, but seen by some academics as expressing insecurity about Canada’s legal 
claims more than confidence.88   
As to the likelihood that this issue could escalate to militarized conflict, 
the chances at present are low. Close cooperation between the two nations’ militaries 
persists and continues to expand, specifically into the maritime domain.89    So long as 
the United States does not press the issue with another unannounced transit, it is likely 
that the status quo will suffice to prevent a show or demonstration of force. The same 
applies to Canadian actions: so long as Canada does not make an attempt to restrict or 
deny passage to any ships for political reasons, the United States will have little motive to 
intervene in Canada’s regulation and management of these waterways. Given the political 
sensitivities associated with the Northwest Passage, however, it is not unreasonable to 
expect that the potential for conflict will escalate and deescalate with their respective 
electoral cycles as pro-military or pro-sovereignty campaign rhetoric and promises could 
provoke posturing (threats or displays of force) by the other side.   
Finally, the issue of internal versus international waters presents Russia 
with an opportunity to increase its diplomatic capital with Canada while simultaneously 
undermining the relationship between Canada and the United States. While most of the 
length of the Northeast Passage clearly consists of international waters, there are several 
points along the route that fall into Russian-claimed “internal” waters (see Figure 7). 
Michael Byers has noted that the common position between the two countries provides 
for a stronger voice in advocating it in relevant international fora. In his view, they must 
act now to secure a “joint Russian-Canadian position on the legal status of the Northern 
Sea Route and Northwest Passage—before it’s too late.”90  Byers holds that “cooperation 
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[in other areas] provides Russia and Canada with a narrow window of opportunity. With 
foreign shipping companies looking north, it is only a matter of time before other 
countries join the United States in overtly opposing Russia[‘s] and Canada’s internal 
waters claims.”91  Not only would such a joint position raise the ire of the United States 
and lead to the same posturing as noted in the past, but it could also undermine Canada’s 
positive political and military relations within NATO, since many Alliance members and 
EU countries stand to lose out economically if these routes become subject to the 
permission and transit restrictions of other nations. Disunity within NATO is obviously in 
the interests of Russia, which feels increasingly encircled by NATO. As is discussed later 
in this chapter in the section on capability, unilateral action by any other Arctic state will 
not be enough to restrain Russia’s activity and claims in the region.   
e. Hans Island – Canada and Denmark 
The final unresolved issue in international Arctic affairs involves a small 
barren “rock” less than one nm2 in area between Canada’s Ellesmere Island and 
Greenland called Hans Island (see Figure 9). The dispute between Canada and Denmark 
has resulted in several diplomatic spats and displays of force between the two countries,92 
but recent press articles indicate that the two countries could possibly reach an agreement 
before the end of 2013.93  While Hans Island is an almost inconsequentially small piece 
of land, it is strategically important to both nations, not only due to political promises and 
pressure to defend their respective Arctic sovereignty, but also because the keeper of 
Hans Island is also the keeper to the gates of the Arctic in a key choke point.   
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Figure 9.   Hans Island94 
It is highly unlikely, in the interim, that the dispute will escalate to the use 
of force between these two NATO allies, but a stalemate in negotiations could increase 
tensions that might hamper cooperation in other domains, especially scientific research 
(in support of continental shelf claims) and collective defense, or lead to a resumption of 
periodic displays of force and occupations. The United States and Russia are not 
concerned with this dispute, however, and any escalation in tensions will remain between 
Canada and Denmark. 
3. Summary 
Receding ice cover in the northern cryosphere presents Arctic nations, and others, 
with considerable economic opportunities. Whether to exploit a potential treasure trove of 
natural resources or simply capitalize on money-saving transportation routes, political 
leaders are under increasing pressure to resolve previously frozen or otherwise 
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insignificant disputes and make these resources available as soon as possible to their 
constituents. Lack of resolution is bad for business: it creates a wild west (or, in this case, 
a no-law north) of uncertainty as to one’s legal standing and exposes countries and 
companies alike to unnecessary harassment and possibly prosecution by rival interests.   
In the dash for dominance, several outstanding issues pose obstacles to a peaceful 
partition of this Arctic abundance. Disagreements over Hans Island have already led to 
small-scale displays of force that could escalate if negotiations failed to result in a 
mutually satisfactory settlement. Meanwhile, politically charged rhetoric over the status 
of the Northwest Passage has led to an increased militarization of the region by all the 
Arctic states in attempts to show resolve and an ability to defend claims and enforce 
sovereignty. While alliances and other cooperative ventures continue to reinforce a spirit 
of amity, political posturing could threaten to break the existing “agreements to disagree” 
and turn benign actions into pretexts for displays of force. Finally, when economic 
developments and disputes are perceived in a larger political-military context by certain 
actors, setbacks in securing economic interests have the potential to elicit a military 
response – especially when such interests are regarded as vital to national security.   
Increasing economic opportunities go hand-in-hand with an increased presence in 
the region, creating the environment for conflict. Economic expansion is triggering an 
associated build-up in military and law enforcement capability in order to protect, defend, 
and regulate interests and claims. If economic encroachment were not enough to cause 
anxiety among the Arctic powers, the subsequent militarization of the Arctic has also 
caused alarm, making countries feel increasingly vulnerable to conventional military 
pressure from a previously ice-obstructed front. The question becomes: do the military 
capabilities of the Arctic nations rise to the challenge? 
C.   CAPABILITY 
If opportunity equates to presence and creates the environment for conflict, a 
second factor to assess when calculating its potential becomes the capability of the Arctic 
powers to utilize this presence to achieve an objective over an opposing interest. As 
Giovanni Valvo of Window on Heartland, observes, Russia is ahead of the game: 
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A strengthening of the Russian military presence in the region through the 
expansion of the Northern Fleet is a means to exercise pressure on the 
international community, should it not accept the scientific evidence of 
Moscow’s claims. Supremacy in the Arctic would allow Russia not only to 
exploit its huge energy resources, but also to turn the Northern Sea Route, 
which travels east via the region to Asia-Pacific markets, into a major 
international trade route controlled by Moscow. This is why Russia’s 
commitment to the strengthening of the Northern Fleet is more than an 
effort aimed at bringing the Russian Navy back to the times of the Soviet 
Union, being rather a sign of the Kremlin’s determination to turn it into 
the cutting edge of tomorrow’s Eurasia, an envisaged geo-economic space 
stretching from the desert steppes of Kazakhstan to the glaciers of the 
North Pole.95 
Due to Russia’s Arctic basing and order of battle, it currently stands out as the 
country most capable of asserting and defending “excessive” claims. The combined 
regional military and law enforcement capability of the other Arctic states (Canada, 
Denmark, Norway, and the United States—all members of NATO) pales in comparison: 
those military platforms which are present are optimized for global thermonuclear war 
(i.e., U.S. ballistic missile submarines) vice the more realistic and likely scenarios of 
scientific research, search and rescue, law enforcement, and low-intensity conflict.   
In order to collect the necessary evidence to support their respective “excessive” 
economic claims, Arctic states will not only need the technological capability to survey 
the region—including ships with icebreaking capability—but also a military and/or law 
enforcement presence capable of defending these claims against rivals, especially in areas 
where claims overlap. In an anarchic system wherein national leaders tend to view 
conflict and competition through a realist lens, it is not international law, but military 
might that functions as the ultimate guarantor of security. If, as the adage goes, 
“possession is nine-tenths of the law,” then the other ten percent is conventional, 
collective deterrence for NATO. In this regard, the words of then-Russian Prime Minister 
Vladimir Putin ring true in a fashion beyond the spirit of cooperation in which he spoke: 
“If you stand alone, you can’t survive in the Arctic. Nature makes people and states help 
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each other.”96  If NATO is to maintain its relevance in the twenty-first century, it must 
come together as a political-military organization to balance against Russian 
encroachment in the Arctic, just as much as Russia is doing now against NATO. Whether 
Moscow’s perception of a NATO threat is valid or not is irrelevant—the perception 
exists, and a military build-up is occurring.   
Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, however, and most recently as a 
consequence of the 2008 global financial crisis that has affected the defense budgets of 
most developed countries, many NATO members have shifted their defense priorities 
elsewhere, and the Arctic region has taken a back seat to more pressing issues. As global 
climate change continues to open this previously inhospitable zone to economic 
exploitation, ignoring developments in the region could have profound consequences in 
the long-term, as both economic and military challenges to NATO’s interests become 
more salient. Admittedly, a similar build-up of NATO forces in the region only further 
validates Moscow’s threat perception and therefore the chances of conflict, but it is 
unavoidable. If Canada is to maintain the legitimacy of its claims as a responsible 
custodian of the Arctic environment and its inhabitants, it requires a military and law 
enforcement presence and corresponding infrastructure. The same goes for the ability to 
maintain a credible and responsive search-and-rescue capability, as pledged by all the 
Arctic powers,97 and in anticipation of their respective constabulary duties as the waters 
open to more commercial traffic. Certain tasks can be accomplished by the same 
platforms; but the more duties that they are required to undertake, the greater the number 
of units that will be necessarily to discharge them, not to mention to provide adequate 
coverage over such a large area. Only by working together as an alliance can the 
individual Arctic NATO members provide adequate presence and protection. Thus, this 
threat analysis turns to the current capabilities of the Arctic nations, followed by an 
assessment of what is needed to close the capability gap between NATO and Russia.    
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1. Arctic Orders of Battle and Comparative Capabilities Analysis 
Ariel Cohen notes that Russia’s Arctic icebreaking order of battle currently stands 
at 18 vessels, seven of which are nuclear powered.98  Significantly, this specialized fleet 
is constantly operating in the Arctic, and the nuclear propulsion capability of seven of 
these vessels gives them an endurance potential that is unmatched by the ships of any 
other nation. Not only do the Russians have a robust ability to conduct research and stake 
claims in the High North, they have the ability to reach and support them, and an entire 
military and coast guard fleet of armed ships to defend them. On the other hand, several 
of these ships are in dire need of life extension overhauls, and the maintenance and 
operational costs of these vessels are extremely high. Given the current demand and high 
price for hydrocarbons exported by Russia, however, the Russians are in a good position 
to assume the costs; and they have planned the construction of four or five new nuclear 
icebreakers to be completed around 2014–17.99  The new-found wealth in Russia’s 
coffers has also provided an opportunity to modernize the rest of its aging military fleet. 
In February 2012, then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin announced that “Russia cannot 
rely on diplomatic and economic methods alone to resolve conflicts. Our country faces 
the task of sufficiently developing its military potential as part of a deterrence strategy. 
This is an indispensable condition for Russia to feel secure and for our partners to listen 
to our country’s arguments.”100    
In comparison, Norway, its nearest Arctic neighbor, only operates one icebreaker, 
the recently built KV Svalbard (commissioned in 2001).101  Having settled its one 
remaining Arctic territorial dispute with Russia in 2010, the Norwegian government 
likely (and prudently) judges that this is sufficient to meet its own constabulary and 
security needs in the region.   
                                                 
98 Cohen, “Russia in the Arctic,” 23.   
99 Oleg Bukharin, “Russia’s Nuclear Icebreaker Fleet,” Science and Global Security 14 (2006): 26–27.   
100 Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: Why Russia Needs to Rebuild Its Military,” Foreign Affairs, 
February 21, 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/being_strong.   
101 Marinelog.com, “DNV Classes Norwegian Coast Guard Icebreaker,” March 12, 2001, 
http://www.marinelog.com/DOCS/NEWSMMII/MMIIMar12.html.   
 44 
Farther west, Denmark’s Arctic territory of Greenland is assigned one helo-
capable Arctic patrol ship, two additional Arctic patrol vessels, and an Arctic patrol 
cutter. The Danish Navy has three operational icebreakers, but one is only fitted for 
survey missions in non-ice waters and the remaining two are incapable of operating in the 
multiyear ice of the Arctic.102  Even when the ice extent is at its nadir in September, the 
ice pack around Greenland is still too thick to safely operate these vessels. They are, 
therefore, limited in operation to the perennial ice of the Baltic Sea.   
Meanwhile, Canada remains the only Arctic nation besides Russia that is actively 
seeking to bolster its presence and capability in the region in order to defend its claims 
and meet the law enforcement and environmental challenges that a more accessible 
Arctic presents. In addition to Canada’s current fleet of six Arctic-capable icebreakers,103 
plans are already underway to build at least one new one (to be ready by 2017),104 as well 
as six to eight new ice-capable armed patrol vessels (based on the Norwegian Svalbard 
Class) for patrolling the “internal” waters of Canada’s claimed archipelago105 year 
round.106 Until these ships are commissioned (in 2015 at the earliest),107 the Canadian 
Navy is only able to patrol the Arctic in the spring, summer, and autumn when there is no 
ice cover.   Meanwhile, Canada is also planning to install an Army training center and to 
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renovate an already existing deep water port in the Arctic region to support its anticipated 
law enforcement and military presence operations.108    
Unfortunately, the final Arctic power and long-standing NATO leader, the United 
States, is not in a position to handle many of its expected and necessary roles as the 
Arctic opens up. Despite efforts by Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama, the U.S. Senate 
has repeatedly failed to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea—a 
treaty regime that would give the country a “seat at the table” to make its own Arctic 
claims (delineation) and to defend against excessive claims by other nations which may 
overlap with legitimate American ones (delimitation). In short, the United States is 
without full legal standing in the Arctic maritime domain when it comes to the 
exploitation and defense against encroachment of its potentially vast deposits of 
hydrocarbon resources.   
In matters of law enforcement and constabulary regulation of waters even within 
its uncontested Arctic EEZ, the United States is likewise without defense or effective 
footing. As it currently stands, the United States has only one operational icebreaker, and 
it is incapable of operating independently in heavy ice conditions. Another icebreaker is 
out of service for a life-extending overhaul (having been taken out of caretaker status), 
and it will be unavailable until at least 2013. A third is immobilized by an engine failure, 
and it is to be decommissioned. Exasperated calls by the Coast Guard for funding to both 
acquire new platforms and extend the service lives of its three remaining icebreakers as a 
stop-gap measure continue to receive little attention on Capitol Hill and thus remain 
unappropriated.   
The effect is already being felt. When engine problems immobilized the USCGC 
Polar Sea in 2010, the McMurdo research station in Antarctica did not receive its supply 
shipment and could not conduct research until a Russian icebreaker was chartered to 
accomplish the mission.109  Even with two operational icebreakers (and the construction 
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of two more), the United States will be unable to fulfill its obligations in the Antarctic 
region in addition to the Congressionally-mandated ones in its own Arctic backyard: 
support to commercial traffic, law enforcement, environmental protection, and research 
and survey operations, among many others. The U.S. Government Accountability Office 
report released in December 2011 notes that defense readiness and waterway security are 
already “significantly” degraded by the lack of current capability.110  In short, the U.S. 
Arctic naval and law enforcement capability is already stretched to the point of 
inadequacy. The demands for its services can only be expected to increase in the coming 
decades.   
2. Projected Capability Needs Assessment 
The National Academies assessment on U.S. needs entitled Polar Icebreakers in a 
Changing World concluded that “new construction is most desirable from the perspective 
of both reliability and incorporating the newest and best available technology.”111  While 
outsourcing some of the Coast Guard’s missions (such as survey and research) might be 
possible, many of its statutory mandates require that the vessel be owned by the 
government and that the missions be conducted by trained and qualified Coast Guard 
personnel only (for instance, sovereignty operations and law enforcement functions).   
The assessment considered service life extensions on existing icebreakers as another 
option, but the time and money involved make it a rather weak and ineffective stop-gap 
measure. Eventually new icebreakers must be built. The money and time spent on life-
extensions would be a wasted investment. The committee conservatively concluded that a 
minimum of two new ships (to make three in total) are necessary to minimally fulfill 
Coast Guard missions.112   
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In his testimony to Congress on the Arctic requirements of the United States 
Coast Guard, Stephen L. Caldwell, Director of the Coast Guard’s division of Homeland 
Security and Justice, cited the findings and recommendations of the High Latitude Study 
Mission Analysis Report prepared for the Coast Guard in July 2010. This report called 
for a minimum of six new icebreakers (three heavy and three medium) to be funded and 
built immediately, just to meet the statutory missions of the service. Caldwell further 
noted that, “if Navy presence requirements are taken into account, the Coast Guard would 
require three additional heavy icebreakers and one additional medium icebreaker for a 
total of ten icebreakers (six heavy and four medium).”113  This would also bring the 
combined NATO capability to par with Russia’s Arctic order of battle.   
On March 1, 2012, the U.S. Coast Guard launched ARCTIC SHIELD 2012, its 
largest deployment ever to the Arctic, in order to test the ability of both ships and 
personnel to operate for extended periods in the harsh climate of the region.114  With an 
inadequate logistics and communications infrastructure, and a single icebreaker incapable 
of winter operations, such a deployment is already limited in scope and duration; and its 
findings would be biased toward summertime conditions and therefore not 
comprehensive. This is nonetheless a positive step forward in collecting evidence to 
support the case for badly needed funds.   
Perhaps it is time for Canada to assume the mantle of leadership within NATO 
regarding Arctic affairs. As the only NATO ally taking the maritime threat posed by a 
more capable and economically aggressive Russia seriously, it stands out as the most 
competent of alliance members to establish an effective doctrine of collective economic 
security by means of military deterrence. Even Canada’s projected strength, however, 
cannot rise to the challenge alone. In order to present a credible deterrent, Norway and 
Denmark must also contribute to a more robust collective and sovereign presence by 
increasing the number of icebreakers and ice-capable armed patrol craft. Finally, all four 
NATO allies should conduct combined Arctic show-of-force (and capability) exercises in 
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the region, not only to practice operating in the environment, but also to establish and 
validate a truly sound doctrine for the collective defense of Arctic economic resources 
and maritime sovereignty. Unfortunately, “the Canadians have made it clear that they do 
not want NATO involved in the Arctic...It is likely that Canadian opposition was the 
reason why the Arctic region was not mentioned in the 2010 Strategic Concept or the 
2012 Chicago summit declaration.”115   
3. Summary 
Military rivalries aside, the Arctic members of NATO suffer from a large gap 
between their political commitments in the region and their ability to honor them. As the 
Arctic ice continues to recede more quickly every year on average, there is simply no 
time to waste in beginning the construction of the necessary platforms and infrastructure 
to fill this gap before the Arctic states become overwhelmed with regulating commercial 
traffic and conducting defensive patrols. It is this build-up of dual-purpose capabilities, 
however, that serves to feed Russia’s threat perception of a NATO determined to encircle 
and “contain” it.   
D. INTENT 
The only piece missing to confirm the existence of a threat, then, are indications 
of the intent to use this capability to achieve malign political objectives. As mentioned in 
the introduction, however, intentions are generally much harder to gauge than 
capabilities. Strategic communications—including public statements by political figures 
and purposeful actions designed to demonstrate resolve—are therefore all the more 
important as indicators of an adversary’s objectives. A survey of such strategic 
communications and actions reveals a highly ambiguous picture—the fog before war (to 
adapt the famous phrase by Clausewitz): an environment in which miscalculations are 
more easily made and conflict more easily ignited. Calls for multilateral cooperation and 
combined exercises are contradicted with abrasive claims of spheres of influence and 
sovereign rights. Meanwhile, countries seeking to establish their territorial and economic 
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claims in the Arctic are utilizing UN procedural channels while conducting flag-planting 
expeditions and seeking funds to bolster their ice-capable naval orders of battle. It is in 
this environment that policy makers must carefully navigate the expanding economic 
opportunities, the increasing operational capabilities, and the ambiguous intentions of 
other nations in order to determine when, where, and to what extent conflict is most 
likely to erupt and be prepared for it through discerning policy, effective posture, and 
consistent vision.   
In the case of Russia, its intent to vigorously establish its presence and its 
willingness to use force to protect its economic claims in areas of unresolved dispute 
have been made explicit on numerous occasions in various areas of its periphery. One 
should expect nothing different in the Arctic, despite less navigable waters. If actions 
speak louder than words, a realist should have no problem understanding Russia’s intent. 
1. Indications of Threat and Use of Force 
a. The United States v. Russia 
In the previous section on opportunity, areas of potential conflict in the 
Arctic were identified. Aside from the low-level shows of force over Hans Island, the 
only other remarkable incidents of maritime conflict in the region have involved the U.S. 
Coast Guard law enforcement actions in the Bering Sea against illegal Russian fishing 
activity in U.S. waters. Taken in isolation, the reported incidents do not amount to much, 
aside from the noted consideration of warning shots to demonstrate resolve and deter 
would-be poachers. This is itself a symptom of an under-resourced force that does not 
have the necessary capability to establish and enforce a credible operational presence and 
deterrence potential to accomplish its law enforcement mandates.  As any student of 
customary law is aware, unsettled disputes quickly assume precedent when a 
government’s presence goes unchallenged (cf. the earlier discussion on opinio juris). 
While the Russian Navy or Border Patrol has not been active in defending a claim in the 
Bering Sea, it has established its own precedent for the use of force elsewhere.   
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b. Russia v. Japan 
According to the Correlates of War database,
116
 of the 11 maritime 
altercations involving Russia noted between 1993 and 2001, six were initiated by Russian 
forces. Four of these disputes involved accusations of poaching, of which three involved 
aggressive uses of force to attack and seize Japanese vessels. In these particular incidents, 
Russian coast guard units accused Japanese fishermen of operating in Russian-controlled 
waters in the vicinity of the Kuril Islands—an area of unresolved dispute between the two 
nations. Such attacks have escalated since 2001: in August 2006, a Japanese fisherman 
was killed in a similar altercation.
117
   
Maritime disputes over natural resources are hardly an uncommon 
occurrence. Indeed, the disputes with the highest potential for rapid escalation are those 
over hydrocarbons: examples include the Sino-Japanese disputes over resources in the 
East China Sea (see Figure 10), and China’s contentious claim over the Spratly Islands in 
the South China Sea. Despite the mediating tools of international institutions, these 
conflicts frequently result in a militarized confrontation, though there has been no 
instance of escalation to war.   
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Figure 10.   Disputed Islands and Waters in the East China Sea118 
c. Japan v. China 
The Sino-Japanese dispute over resources and territory is becoming 
increasingly salient and militarized. According to Mure Dickie, Tokyo Bureau Chief for 
the Financial Times,  
Japan’s pacifistic constitution may outlaw aggressive war, but in Tokyo 
there is a firm political consensus that the Senkaku are an integral part of 
the nation’s territory—to be defended by force if necessary. But China, 
which calls the islands the Diaoyu, appears increasingly willing to test 
Japan’s control by sending state fisheries vessels through their territorial 
waters. And the tone and martial language of protests in China this month 
against Japan’s purchase of three of the islands made clear that some 
Chinese at least are spoiling for a fight. Moves by Chinese and Taiwanese 
state vessels and fishing boats to challenge Japan’s de facto control of the 
islands could lead to a potentially fatal accident that some analysts say 
could further escalate hostility from China.119   
Such observations have likewise been noted officially by the Japanese 
government in its 2012 Defense White Paper, which cited an increased presence of 
Chinese law enforcement agencies conducting “monitoring activities” near Japanese 
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waters and at least nine separate incidents in which Chinese vessels violated Japanese 
territorial waters in the vicinity of the Senkaku islands,120 including one incident in 
which a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a Japanese patrol boat.121  James Manicom, 
a Post-doctoral Fellow at the Balsillie School of International Affairs in Waterloo, 
Ontario, and a Visiting Researcher at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation in Tokyo, 
similarly observes that 
There are a growing number of government vessels enforcing jurisdiction 
in the East China Sea. Both the Chinese and Japanese navies are more 
active than ever. China also has five different civilian agencies that 
enforce some aspect of its maritime jurisdiction and the JCG [Japanese 
Coast Guard] is the only Japanese foreign policy actor that is allowed to 
open fire on those that violate Japan’s maritime jurisdiction. These 
[Chinese and Japanese naval and law enforcement] agencies do not speak 
to each other but interact with greater frequency in areas where both China 
and Japan claim jurisdiction.122 
Manicom notes that, considering the lack of success in locating any significant deposits 
of the estimated 160 to 200 billion barrels of oil or 175 to 210 trillion cubic feet of gas in 
the area, “the proven East China Sea gas fields are not a game changer for the energy 
security of either state. That doesn’t mean that these reserves are not useful, 
however…From Japan’s perspective, the gas reserves are relatively worthless.”123  Thus, 
in a politically charged environment lacking in transparency, it is the principle, not the 
substance, of a claim that is important, and evidently worth the cost of defending 
militarily. According to Japanese Defense Councilor Yasuhisa Ishizuka, “From our crisis-
management perspective, it becomes more difficult to interpret intentions and purpose of 
various actions on the Chinese side.”124  The fog before war thus thickens.   
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d. China v. Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei 
Farther south, another five-nation dispute has led to even more significant 
militarized conflict over the Spratly Islands (among others) in the South China Sea (see 
Figure 11). Even as far back as the Second World War, Japan laid claim and defended 
these islands in order to exploit their vast reserves of hydrocarbon resources. Now, China, 
Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei compete to secure their rightful claims to 
this lucrative and strategic area. This competition has escalated on numerous occasions to 
include not only threats of force, but uses of force including direct fire, occupations, 
seizures, arrests, and killings.125 
 
 
Figure 11.   Disputed Islands and Waters in the South China Sea126 
It is therefore evident that ample precedent for countries to engage in low-
level conflict over natural resources exists, including the countries in question, Russia 
and the United States. There is no substantiated reason to presume that Arctic states are 
any less likely to resort to force in that region when similar interests are at stake. 
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Naturally, appeals for diplomacy are a prudent and economically wise first step, but when 
diplomacy is incapable of achieving a resolution, some nations may resort to force. 
According to Article 51 of the UN Charter, “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against 
a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures 
necessary to maintain international peace and security.”127   
2. Indications of Intent to Use Force 
If actions alone are not enough evidence to support an assessment of an intention 
to use force, however, then it is necessary to examine the political rhetoric and strategic 
communications, as well as the motivations behind them, to better understand the intent 
of Russia to defend its diplomatic claims with military might if necessary.   
a. Russia’s Motivation 
The resources in the Arctic are of much more vital importance to the 
Russian government than the fishing grounds in the Pacific. While estimates vary widely, 
they generally indicate that 35 to 50 percent of the Russian federal budget derives directly 
from hydrocarbon export taxes and sales.128  Whereas many economists regarded “the 
rapid growth in virtually every sector of the Russian economy” during President Putin’s 
first two terms in office (2000–2008) as a proof that the economy was diversifying away 
from a dependence on oil, Clifford Gaddy and Barry Ickes demonstrate quite vividly how 
“the abrupt collapse of oil prices in the summer of 2008 made it hard to ignore how 
dependent these other sectors had been on the high oil prices” of the previous eight 
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years.129  This reliance on natural resources is probably a key reason that, in the latest 
Russian Arctic Strategy, they were described as a strategic resource for national 
security.130   
In order to protect Russia’s interests in the Arctic, therefore, the Russian 
National Security Strategy calls for increasing the role of the military in the region and 
even states, “In case of a competitive struggle for resources it is not impossible to 
discount that it might be resolved by a decision to use military might.”131  With the 
largest Arctic fleet in the world, both in terms of military assets and icebreaking support 
vessels, Russia is well-positioned to back up its policy with action. A broader look 
reveals that in addition to bolstering their maritime presence in the Arctic, the Russians 
have also increased their air and ground presence in the region—further increasing 
NATO’s uneasiness that Moscow is re-militarizing the Arctic. In addition to Defense 
Minister Anatoly Serdyukov’s announcement of the creation of two Arctic brigades “to 
protect its valuable Arctic resources,” then-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated, “As [far 
as] our own geo-political interests [in the Arctic] are concerned, we shall be protecting 
them firmly and consistently.”132 In July 2012, Vladimir Putin, in his capacity as 
president, clarified that “the navy is an instrument to protect national economic interests, 
including in such regions as the Arctic,” and that he expected to increase Russia’s naval 
order of battle by 51 units by 2020.133  Finally, while the Russian Foreign Minister stated 
in 2008 that “Russia strictly abides by the norms and principles of international law and 
is firmly determined to act within existing international agreements and mechanisms,”134 
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it is important to remember that the country has repeatedly, before, during, and after this 
statement, violated international agreements and failed to utilize conflict resolution 
mechanisms to settle disputes in other parts of the world.135   
b. The NATO Perspective 
As mentioned earlier, NATO has continued to ignore the Arctic as a 
potential theater of operations. In a certain respect, this does help mute Russia’s charges 
of a NATO-led militarization of the Arctic; but when four of the five Arctic nations are 
NATO members, a connection can still be drawn. Therefore, whether the organization 
ever formally institutes an Arctic strategy of its own, Russia will probably continue to 
perceive the individual actions of the other nations in a NATO context.   
Meanwhile, Canada, the most vocal opponent of NATO involvement in 
the Arctic, is also the most rhetorically determined regional state aside from Russia.   
During an annual tour of the “True North,” Prime Minister Stephen Harper commented 
that “The first and highest priority of our northern strategy is the protection of our Arctic 
sovereignty. And as I have said many times before, the first principle of sovereignty is to 
use it or lose it.”136  To that end, he has pledged and pushed for the construction of more 
ice-capable patrol vessels and improved infrastructure in the underdeveloped Arctic 
region of his country. He has broad support for his initiative among the Canadian public.   
A January 2011 public opinion survey conducted by the University of 
Toronto Munk School of Global Affairs found that “Canadians, regardless of where they 
live, tend to see the Arctic as highly important and feel that it is deserving of a dominant 
place in [their] foreign policy…a clear majority of Canadians from all regions of the 
country want to increase Canada’s military presence in the Arctic.”137  Having also 
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surveyed the publics of the other Arctic Council member nation states, the study 
additionally found that, surprisingly, “it is Canadian public opinion, rather than 
American, that is least open to negotiation and compromise [on Arctic issues]…When it 
comes to Northern sovereignty, Canadians seem to look more like the stereotypical 
American and Americans are cast in the more cooperative ‘Canadian’ approach.”138   
However, while Russia and the United States figured very low in the 
Canadian popularity contest, China ranked the lowest.139  Is it not surprising, then, that 
when Prime Minister Harper was asked by a Chinese journalist to comment on the 
Canadian opinion that the Arctic is for Arctic powers only and what he thought about the 
role of outside interests in the region, he responded, quite frankly: “The government of 
Canada, working with our partners and the people in this region, intend to assert our 
sovereignty in these regions… In terms of what happens outside sovereign territories, 
Canada will work with the Arctic Council and other organizations to encourage co-
operative activity, peaceful transit and peaceful development.”140  In other words, other 
nations are welcome to visit, but they are not welcome to stay, and most certainly not 
without an invitation in either case.   
While scholars like Michael Byers have proposed avenues of cooperation 
with Russia, Canadian political and military leaders continue to hold annual exercises 
designed specifically to counter any Russian gambits for Arctic hegemony. Operation 
NANOOK 11, a combined exercise with the United States and Denmark, employed 1,100 
Canadian soldiers in a fictitious scenario “to defend Ottawa’s sovereignty in the Far 
North” and is regarded by analysts as a warning to Russia in its efforts to claim areas of 
the Arctic contested with both Canada and Denmark (i.e., the Lomonosov Ridge).141  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that while Canada is highly protective of its sovereignty, 
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there is little indication at this time in either public statements or strategic 
communications to indicate an intention to use these forces unless attacked. Perhaps the 
Canadians are satisfied that their actions speak for themselves and that their reasons and 
interests are clear.   
3. Summary 
Intent implies a purpose to one’s actions or aspirations. To put it another way, 
actions and aspiration signal intent. In the case of Russian actions and rhetoric in the 
Arctic, one can deduce nothing but firm and committed intent on the part of its leadership 
to secure its claims. There have been scant, if any, peaceful actions undertaken by the 
Putin and Medvedev administrations to back up their peace-seeking rhetoric. Calls for 
diplomatic resolution of territorial disputes in the Arctic and for working “within existing 
international agreements and mechanisms” are only operationalized through agreements 
to cooperate on search and rescue efforts and (competitive) scientific exploration and 
research for submission to a forum that has no binding authority to settle such disputes. 
Meanwhile, ambitious militarization of the Arctic is clearly reinforced with explicit 
rhetoric proclaiming their intent to defend their national security interests. As noted 
previously, for Russia, the natural resources in the Arctic are a national security asset of 
strategic importance.   
Canada, too, beats the drum of sovereign defense in the Arctic, though its rhetoric 
is significantly less militaristic than that of Russia. Actions, in this case, speak for 
themselves. The Canadians will build up forces in the region to the extent necessary to 
defend their sovereignty. If Prime Minister Harper had his way, this build-up would be 
happening more quickly than it has been. Indeed, financial constraints constitute the only 
reason that the four NATO countries in the Arctic have not been building up their Arctic 
capabilities more rapidly. 
The bottom line is that the intent of the Arctic nations to defend their regional and 




very slowly coming into service, are materializing, and the economic opportunity has 
never been greater and will only increase in the future. The threat of a militarized conflict 
in the Arctic is therefore real as well.   
E. CONCLUSION 
Opportunity, capability, and perceived intent on their own do not cause conflict, 
but they do serve to increase anxiety about an apparent threat to one’s interests. It is when 
these three factors combine that the potential for conflict emerges. All that remains for an 
otherwise benign event to quickly escalate into a militarized interstate dispute is a 
sufficient motive or misunderstanding. In the Arctic, such motives include Russia’s 
critical reliance on hydrocarbon resources to maintain its political and economic stability, 
and therefore its national security. For the United States and its NATO allies, the need to 
maintain and credibly defend their sovereignty and their own economic interests provide 
ample incentive to act decisively, if necessary. When one’s security is challenged or 
threatened by another power, the potential for militarized conflict can quickly become an 
actual conflict. Despite the sub-zero physical climate, the Arctic is a hotbed of competing 
interests.   
At present, only Russia is capable of effectively defending its claims in the Arctic 
with its current military and law enforcement capabilities. Given Russia’s economic 
dependence on hydrocarbon resources—which the Arctic promises to offer in 
abundance—Moscow’s economic claims in excess of its recognized EEZ are likely to 
encroach on, or overlap with, the legitimate claims of neighbors. But it stands alone. 
Russia’s overwhelming might in this domain will eventually make “right” in its favor if 
NATO is unable to deter assertive uses of force similar to those which the Russian Coast 
Guard continually subjects Japan near the Kuril Islands. Any loss in this regard would be 
much more damaging to NATO’s deterrence credibility than its current inaction.   
Unless Canada, Denmark, Norway and the United States can come together under 
the NATO banner and make the Arctic a centerpiece of the Alliance’s collective defense 
agenda for the twenty-first century, they each risk standing alone in the Arctic as well, 
and with a significantly smaller troop-to-task capability than their geopolitical rival. 
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Simon Ollivant’s 1984 warning of the dangers of internal dispute within the Alliance is 
perhaps even more salient today. Denmark and Canada have yet to officially resolve their 
dispute over Hans Island. Canada and the United States continue to argue over the legal 
status of the Northwest Passage and the Beaufort Sea. Either one of these disputes could 
undermine decades of Alliance cohesion.   
 According to the National Academies, “Projecting an active and 
influential presence in the polar regions requires that the United States [and by extension, 
NATO] be able to access polar sites at various times of the year, reliably and at will. It is 
the judgment of this committee that this need is only partially fulfilled by airborne, space-
borne, and submarine assets and that a physical surface presence is necessitated by 
geopolitics.”142 At present, the United States and NATO, writ large, are unable to provide 
this critical presence. Only Canada is taking the necessary steps to meet the future 
defense and law enforcement needs presented by an opening Arctic region, and then only 
as a unilateral measure and not as part of a concerted, comprehensive Alliance program. 
Perhaps a rising Canada will take a much-needed leadership role in the “True North” and 
provide the crucial motivation within NATO to spur its Arctic allies into action. Given 
Canada’s present position on the subject, however, it is incumbent on the United States, 
in cooperation with Norway and Denmark, to promote a more robust “Arctic awareness 
in the alliance.”143   
The prioritization fallacy of politicians assumes a model of fiscal discipline in 
which some aspects of national and collective defense are more important than others and 
thus deserve more immediate attention and funding. In today’s globalized international 
system, economic warfare can be just as costly to a nation as conventional warfare. 
Indeed, one’s enemies look to exploit gaps and other weaknesses in defensive strategies, 
rather than attack a “prioritized” strength head-on. The Arctic is NATO’s Achilles heel. 
The threat presented by an opening Arctic should be taken more seriously by the 
Alliance’s political leaders. At the same time, it may be NATO’s salvation. The region 
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presents the Alliance with its most credible mission since the end of the Cold War as a 
political-military organization—an opportunity to rejuvenate its collective defense 
doctrine in the face of a new arena of warfare. To protect itself, the Alliance must act 
now to enhance its (collective) military and (national) law enforcement presence in the 
region on the one hand, and close the gap legally and diplomatically by U.S. accession to 
the UNCLOS on the other. Only a comprehensive approach can ensure that the Alliance’s 
shared security interests are well-defended in the international arena. An ounce of 
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III. MITIGATING FACTORS? 
“The ambitions of the actors in the theatre may soon be at odds with the 
prevailing ‘Pax Arctica’ doctrine that claims, at least publicly, that the 
international rule of law, prudence and co-operation will govern the 
judgment and behaviour of all players for the foreseeable future.”   
—Irvin Studin, 
Fellow, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, 
University of Singapore144 
 
Since World War II, the tenets of international institutionalism have taken root in 
the establishment of several interest-based multilateral organizations for collective 
security and dispute resolution. The enduring nature of these organizations and fora 
attests to their almost unanimous recognition by states and individuals alike as legitimate, 
useful, and most importantly efficient, at least in some circumstances, in achieving their 
founding goals – namely peaceful resolution or prevention of interstate disputes.   
Recognition as legitimate organizations endows international institutions with an 
ability to speak on behalf of their constituencies and to act with the force of law, 
neutrality, or collective deterrence. A proven record of handling issues in accordance 
with their founding charters strengthens their position as credible and capable instruments 
of dialogue and mediation. This legitimacy, in turn, enables these fora to function as 
useful tools of arbitration or negotiation to obtain political objectives when bilateral talks 
have failed and reinforces their role as an intervening step in the escalation of a dispute. 
Indeed, many international institutions have established themselves as norms in 
international relations to such an extent that a failure to utilize them is regarded as 
significantly damaging to a state’s case for pursuing a given political objective. It can 
also result in a backlash of international condemnation or punitive sanction, making any 
victory obtained through aggression more politically pyrrhic than profitable. Finally, 
international institutions offer a less destructive means of dispute resolution than war, 
especially when such conflicts are multilateral in nature. By tackling such problems 
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through organizations specifically designed to mitigate interstate and intraregional 
disputes, a certain weight of process, protocol, and time is brought to bear in negotiations, 
and one settlement may satisfy multiple parties, rather than attempting to negotiate 
several bilateral agreements.   
The apparent success of international institutionalism has likewise led to the 
genesis of new theories in international relations such as the Democratic Peace Theory, 
and its economic corollary, the Capitalist Peace Theory.145  The former theory indicates 
that established and developed democratic societies are highly unlikely to resort to armed 
conflict to resolve disputes between them. In this case, common interests, institutions, 
and methodologies serve as vectors for understanding and trust. The more interests, 
institutions, and methodologies are shared, the more likely it is that disputes will be 
resolved though mutually agreeable and peaceful mechanisms. In the case of the latter 
theory, the vectors connecting two nations are economic rather than political or social, 
and more robust interconnectedness creates an economic incentive not to disrupt a 
mutually beneficial source of wealth, stability, and power.   
For these reasons, the appeal of international organizations and economic 
interdependence to mitigate the threat of militarized interstate disputes holds significant 
sway in the realm of international relations and in political and professional discussions 
of the matter. As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, politicians, scholars, and 
journalists all tout international institutions as a necessary and critical component of 
conflict resolution. In both rhetoric and practice, states continue to use them as tools to 
pursue their political objectives. Precisely because international institutions are often 
perceived as legitimate, useful, and efficient in preventing conflict, they are also assumed 
to be effective at guaranteeing these same ends. When arbitration or economic ties are 
perceived to be biased or inconducive to one’s vital interests, however, ideals hold little 
sway over pragmatic interests or calculated political realism. Thus, the mitigating effect 
of international institutions has the same limitations of opportunity, capability, and intent 
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based on a state’s perception of the capacity of such fora to meet its interests.    The 
purpose of this chapter is to highlight both the potential and the limitations of 
international institutions as mitigating factors against conflict in interstate disputes in the 
Arctic.   
This chapter begins with an overview of the key fora for dispute mitigation in the 
Arctic, followed by an assessment of the Capitalist Peace Theory as an alternative means 
of mitigating disputes.   The findings of this chapter lead to the conclusion that while 
international institutions and economic interdependence are useful, they are not a panacea 
for conflict, especially where national security interests are concerned.    
A. CONFLICT RESOLUTION MECHANISMS AND FORA 
Until the Arctic ice cap began receding to a considerable extent in the early 
2000s, the region was largely regarded as a barren expanse of little political value, and 
certainly no economic value. The territorial disputes mentioned in Chapter II were largely 
suppressed by an overriding need for solidarity within the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) against the aims of the Soviet Union. The limited geostrategic 
value assigned to the Arctic during the Cold War lie solely within the military domain, 
and even then it was more narrowly confined to conflict involving nuclear arms. As such, 
the consultative bodies established by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) 
treaties and the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) sufficed as appropriate 
fora for resolving “Arctic” disputes.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, in the last decade increased economic 
opportunities have likewise increased the geostrategic value of the region. Additional 
military capabilities are coming online to defend the competing interests of the Arctic 
nations, and political intent to ensure national security throughout the northern 
cryosphere increases the potential for an armed altercation. In an attempt to mitigate this 
potential, regional governments are seeking venues of arbitration and cooperation in 
order to achieve their political goals peacefully. Three fora in particular present the Arctic 
powers with legitimate mechanisms to resolve their territorial disputes  and reduce the 
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likelihood of conflict: (1) the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS); (2) the NATO-Russia Council; and (3) the Arctic Council. Each is discussed 
in turn below.   
1. The UNCLOS 
In the twenty-first century, the “Law of the Sea” is by and large understood and 
obeyed with uniform recognition of rights and responsibilities, but such “customary law” 
had not always been so stable or comprehensive. The terms, limits, rights, and roles of 
maritime nations had been continually evolving over centuries. Disputes over territory 
had to be resolved on a case-by-case basis and claims usually had to be enforced by 
armed presence to gain legitimacy. It was not until the mid-twentieth century that 
sufficient impetus manifested to consolidate and codify these rules of the road into 
binding international maritime law.   
a. Background 
On September 28, 1945, President Harry Truman of the United States 
unilaterally issued Proclamation 2667, setting forth the “Policy of the United States with 
Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf.”  
The consequences of this proclamation fundamentally changed the definition of territorial 
waters and jurisdiction over maritime resources in international law. Until this point, 
customary international law recognized the territorial waters of any state only out to a 
distance of three nautical miles (or one league). The eighteenth century Dutch jurist 
Cornelius van Bynkershoek justified this distance on pragmatic grounds insofar as this 
was the maximum range that a coastal cannon could reach and thereby establish effective 
control over a state’s contiguous seas – the so-called “cannon shot rule.”146   
On the grounds that “recognized jurisdiction over these resources [new 
sources of petroleum and other minerals in the continental shelf of the United States] is 
required in the interest of their conservation and prudent utilization when and as 
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development is undertaken,”147 the Truman Proclamation extended America’s exclusive 
jurisdiction over these resources far beyond the traditional three nautical mile limit. At 
the same time, however, the proclamation explicitly noted that  
In cases where the continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, 
or is shared with an adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by 
the United States and the State concerned in accordance with equitable 
principles. The character as high seas of the waters above the continental 
shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation are in no way 
thus affected.148   
For a blue water naval power and a global economic power, recognition of the freedom of 
navigation was paramount. This Proclamation at once unilaterally and arbitrarily 
extended jurisdiction over an increased area of potential resources (to the outer limits of a 
state’s continental shelf) while maintaining the neutrality of the international legal status 
of the water above it. In effect, the United States proclaimed that it would have its cake 
and eat it, too, by claiming both the mineral rights under the sea and the freedom to travel 
anywhere within and over it (beyond recognized territorial waters). Soon, maritime 
powers across the globe began to claim their own exclusive economic zones or to 
arbitrarily invoke sovereign rights over extended territorial waters, in some cases, like 
Peru, out to 200 nautical miles. Disputes immediately arose, but short of armed presence, 
there was no means to secure these claims with international recognition.   
From 1956 to 1958, the United Nations held its first Convention on the 
Law of the Sea in Geneva, Switzerland. At this first Convention (generally referred to as 
“UNCLOS I”), delegates negotiated and adopted into international law several 
conventions defining the “Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone,” the “Continental Shelf,” 
and the “High Seas,” as well as an internationally recognized regulatory regime regarding 
“Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas.”  The United States 
and other Convention parties quickly recognized, however, that “the rapidly proliferating 
number of expansive claims [over territorial waters and EEZs]…would restrict 
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fundamental freedom of navigation rights,” and that economic interests in maritime 
resources demanded “legal certainty” governing offshore exploration and resource 
exploitation.149  A second Convention (“UNCLOS II”) was convened in 1960, but 
several of the disputes that had emerged from the UNCLOS I definitions remained 
unresolved.150  The third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS 
III,” hereafter referred to as simply “the UNCLOS” unless otherwise distinguished by 
specific iteration), which convened from 1973 through 1982, codified existing practices 
of customary maritime law, established categorical limits to the UNCLOS I definitions, 
and created protocols for the resolution of disputed claims.   
b. Peaceful Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
In addition to delineating definitions and rights, the UNCLOS also sets 
forth protocol and procedures for states with maritime disputes to delimit their respective 
maritime boundaries vis-à-vis neighboring countries with opposite or adjacent coasts or 
to challenge the “interpretation and application of [the] Convention” in general. Part XV, 
Section 1, Article 279 of the UNCLOS specifically enjoins Parties to the Convention to 
“settle any dispute between them…by peaceful means,” while Article 280 encourages 
members to work out agreements between themselves. In the event that a separate 
bilateral, multilateral, or general agreement cannot be reached, Part XV provides for 
several dispute resolution mechanisms including conciliation (“peer-mediation” of the 
dispute conducted in accordance with the procedures established in Annex V of the 
UNCLOS) or mutually agreeable submission to one of four recognized bodies of 
arbitration, the final judgments of which are all binding. These bodies include the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Annex VI), the International Court of 
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Justice, general arbitration (Annex VII), or special arbitration (Annex VIII) when the 
dispute involves fisheries, protection and preservation of the maritime environment, 
scientific research, or navigation, including pollution by vessels and by dumping. States 
may declare upon accession to the Convention which of these options they accept for the 
mediation of any future disputes or will otherwise be subject to general arbitration 
(Annex VII).    
c. Limitations of the UNCLOS 
While signatories to the Convention are pressed to resolve their disputes 
peacefully, a few key factors inherent within the Convention itself inhibit such an ideal 
solution for the Arctic states. Firstly, the dispute resolution mechanisms of the UNCLOS 
are only available to parties to the Convention, and the United States remains outside the 
regime. It can neither submit its claims to the Commission on the Limits of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) for adjudication nor appeal for arbitration in order to settle its 
outstanding maritime boundary dispute with Russia.   
Secondly, as mentioned previously, Article 4 of the Convention asserts a 
ten-year limit for Parties to submit “excessive” continental shelf claims to the CLCS for 
adjudication. Adjudication, however, only provides an internationally recognized 
delineation of the claim and not a final delimitation where such a claim may be disputed 
by a state with an opposite or adjacent coast. Such disputes must be settled by mutual 
agreement of the contesting parties, or submitted to one of the aforementioned bodies for 
a binding resolution.   
In the case of Russia in particular, upon acceding to the UNCLOS in 1997 
and in accordance with Article 298 therein, it declared that it  
does not accept the procedures, provided for in Section 2 of Part XV of the 
Convention, entailing binding decisions with respect to disputes 
concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 of the 
Convention, relating to sea boundary delimitations, or those involving 
historic bays or titles; disputes concerning military activities, including 
military activities by government vessels and aircraft, and disputes 
concerning law-enforcement activities in regard to the exercise of 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction; and disputes in respect of which the 
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Security Council of the United Nations is exercising the functions 
assigned to it by the Charter of the United Nations.151 
In effect, Moscow declared that it would accept delimitation of disputed boundaries only 
on a bilateral basis, negotiated outside the UNCLOS regime. Russia’s pending 
resubmission152 to the CLCS of its excessive continental shelf claims has been 
interpreted as merely a diplomatic maneuver of convenience to gain recognition for its 
claims and not an earnest effort to use the UNCLOS as a peaceful dispute resolution 
mechanism.   
2. NATO-Russia Council 
The second significant organization germane to relations among the Arctic 
nations is the NATO-Russia Council (NRC).   
a. Background 
The 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security 
between NATO and the Russian Federation set forth the cooperative framework within 
which the NATO Allies and Russia agreed to cooperate to maintain peace and stability 
within an undivided Europe. The subsequent 2002 Rome Declaration entitled “NATO-
Russia Relations: a New Quality” established the NRC as the successor to the Permanent 
Joint Council. The NRC is supposed to mitigate conflict between the NATO member 
states and the Russian Federation though open, transparent, and reciprocal dialogue and 
cooperative engagement on issues of mutual interest. According to the Founding Act, 
“NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries. They share the goal of 
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overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and competition and of strengthening 
mutual trust and cooperation.”153   
b. Peaceful Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
To that end, the NRC meets regularly to discuss issues of mutual interest 
relating to “terrorism, proliferation, peacekeeping, theatre missile defense, airspace 
management, civil emergencies, defense reform, logistics, and scientific cooperation 
focused on new threats and challenges.”154  The Arctic would certainly constitute a new 
challenge of mutual interest in NATO-Russia relations. According to Marten Lindberg, a 
contributing writer for the International Relations and Security Network (ISN) of the 
Zurich-based Center for Security Studies (ETH), since Russia planted a flag on the 
seabed under the North Pole in 2007, “Arctic policy has been a standard topic of 
discussion in the ‘NATO-Russia Council’…In the latest meeting in April [2012], both 
sides agreed that whatever security challenges they meet over the Arctic are best 
addressed jointly.”155   
Lindberg holds that disunity within the Alliance over Arctic policy 
prevents the issue from becoming militarized in a NATO-Russia context:   
For all of NATO’s attempts to coordinate military capabilities, there is no 
consensus on how these forces should be deployed. Canada famously 
vetoed the Alliance’s first attempt (in 2009) to enact an Arctic policy and 
was likely to be behind the decision to make no mention of the Arctic at 
the recent Chicago summit. By contrast, Norway is a keen advocate of 
NATO consolidating its influence in the high north. Indeed, the United 
States, Denmark, and presumably the three remaining Scandinavian states, 
also support increased NATO engagement, providing this is limited to 
responding to natural disasters.156 
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Disunity within NATO, however, only serves to complicate security issues 
in the Arctic and ultimately undermines the efficacy of NATO-Russia consultations 
within the framework of the NRC as a conflict resolution mechanism.   
c. Limitations of the NRC 
Canada’s noted objections to including Arctic security in NATO’s 2010 
Strategic Concept or the 2012 Chicago NATO summit declaration mean that any such 
discussion within NATO channels does not represent the position of the Alliance as a 
whole. This can only serve to create a sense of growing insecurity on the part of smaller 
Arctic states such as Norway and Denmark with inadequate indigenous capacity to secure 
their national economic and security interests in the region outside of a NATO banner. 
Meanwhile, with the NRC focus on conventional arms limitations aimed solely at land 
forces and aircraft over the continental European landmass as provided for in the Treaty 
on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), little official attention is given to the 
naval arms race occurring in the water just to the north of the same area.   
Secondly, it should be noted that while public statements regarding 
cooperation between the Alliance and Russia continue to offer the appearance of smooth 
relations between the two parties, the reality of NATO-Russia relations has been less than 
harmonious. As noted on the NATO website, “Following Russia’s disproportionate 
military action in Georgia in early August 2008, the Alliance suspended formal meetings 
of the NRC and cooperation in some areas, while it considered the implications of 
Russia’s actions for the NATO-Russia relationship.”157  From the Russian perspective, 
NATO’s statement in 2008 that Georgia and Ukraine (both former Soviet republics) 
would eventually join the Alliance was perceived as an unacceptable encroachment into 
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Russia’s “traditional” sphere of influence and an illustration of NATO’s disregard for 
Russian security interests in the region.158   
By the time of the NATO Lisbon Summit in 2010, relations seemed to 
have improved to a considerable extent, with leaders on both sides claiming to have 
overcome historical differences and to have embraced a willingness to cooperate.159  
“Since Lisbon, however,” notes Monaghan,  
discordant notes have sounded louder, particularly in announcements by 
senior Russian officials. This is in large part due to ongoing differences in 
defining [the] partnership, not just in terms of the agenda, but also 
approach. Although there may be a common agenda, it is not yet ‘mutual’ 
in terms of defining priorities, nor is it ‘joint’ in terms of how cooperation 
is planned or enacted.160   
Monaghan also points out that “hopes for greater cooperation from 
Moscow appear to be optimistic, since Moscow will seek to defend what it sees as 
Russia’s interests above simple partnership.”161   
Indeed, Russia’s “disproportionate military actions” in Georgia in 2008, as 
well as its economic warfare tactics vis-à-vis Ukraine in 2006, 2008 and 2009 showed 
that the NRC had no teeth to compel adherence to its founding principles or to ensure 
implementation of its crisis management functions. With no ability to veto or punish the 
actions of any of its members or to mandate consultations before making decisions or 
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taking action, the NRC is useless as a dispute resolution mechanism, especially where 
national security interests are concerned.   
3. The Arctic Council 
The third significant international institution mentioned in literature advocating 
the likelihood of peaceful cooperation in the Arctic is the Arctic Council—an 
organization consisting of high-level government representatives from each of the eight 
countries with territory within the Arctic Circle, including Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. It was established in 1996 by 
the Ottawa Declaration to “provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and 
interaction among the Arctic States, with the involvement of indigenous and other Arctic 
inhabitants on common Arctic issues, in particular issues of sustainable development and 
environmental protection in the Arctic. The scientific work of the Arctic Council is 
carried out in six expert working groups.”162  
As the primary focus of the Arctic Council is the preservation of the Arctic 
environment, it is significant that the Arctic Council also provides for permanent 
representation by six recognized tribal confederations with “full consultation rights in 
connection with the Council’s negotiations and decisions.”163  This unique feature of the 
organization strengthens the voice of those subnational entities most directly affected by 
developments in the region and provides a strong civilian-focused orientation to Arctic 
Council policies and programs.   
a. Background 
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev’s reform policy of glasnost’ paved 
the way for a thawing in Arctic relations previously frozen and paralyzed by a 
militarization of the region during the Cold War. By 1989, relations had improved to such 
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an extent that all eight Arctic states agreed to meet in Rovaniemi, Finland, to discuss an 
issue of common concern: the fragility of the Arctic environment and its importance to 
their respective peoples.   
In 1991, the nations agreed to cooperate on a joint Arctic Environmental 
Protection Strategy (AEPS) which “concentrated on cooperation in scientific research and 
sharing of data on effects of pollution as well as assessing the potential environmental 
impacts of development activities in the Arctic.”164  The rapidly changing environmental 
dynamics in the region, coupled with a monumental restructuring in international 
relations, meant a more robust organizational charter would be needed to tackle these 
problems. In 1996, the Ottawa Declaration established the Arctic Council to replace the 
AEPS as the formal deliberative and coordinating body for issues of Arctic development, 
environmental protection, and safety involving the eight Arctic states and the six 
indigenous confederations.     
b. Peaceful Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
The Arctic Council operates through six working groups which serve to 
coordinate policy regarding Arctic contaminants; monitoring and assessment programs; 
conservation; emergency prevention, preparedness and response; environmental 
protection; and sustainable development. In 2011, the Council approved its first legally-
binding resolution regarding Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR).165  In 
the realm of SAR and environmental protection, there is little disagreement among 
member states and permanent participants. Thus, while the agreement marks a significant 
achievement in reinforcing the legitimacy, usefulness, and efficiency of the organization, 
for the purposes of the present argument, it is likely that the future activities and output of 
the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG) will be more germane to conflict 
in the Arctic. Since 1998, the SDWG has issued several reports regarding the impact of 
climate change and energy development in the Arctic, but it has yet to coordinate a 
comprehensive binding strategy and policy among its members on the issue.   
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Perhaps in part this is due to the undermining influence of the 2008 
Ilulissat Declaration made by the five “circumpolar” Arctic states of Canada, Denmark, 
Norway, Russia, and the United States (with the contentious exclusion of the remaining 
members of the Arctic Council) wherein they agreed that the UNCLOS “provides a solid 
foundation for responsible management by the five coastal States…[and that they] 
therefore see no need to develop a new comprehensive international legal regime to 
govern the Arctic Ocean.”166   
c. Limitations of the Arctic Council 
It must be noted that the Ottawa Declaration itself makes a point of 
explicitly qualifying and limiting the scope of “Arctic issues” which the Council is meant 
to address when it footnotes the term, stating that “The Arctic Council should not deal 
with matters related to military security.”  It is indeed telling that Thomas Winkler, the 
head of the Danish government’s International Law Department in Copenhagen, stated 
that the “meeting in Ilulissat is not a competition to the Arctic Council. The issues that 
we’re going to discuss will be issues that is [sic] the responsibility of the five coastal 
states of the Arctic Ocean.”167  Clearly the “circumpolar” Arctic states regard the Arctic 
Council as an insufficient, ineffective, and inappropriate organization for the resolution 
of national security-related disputes.   
The Arctic Portal168 points out these deficiencies in this area when it 
notes,  
The fact is…that there is lacking a common political agenda for the future 
in the Arctic and a legal framework for the emerging maritime 
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activities...Most of these activities must be undertaken jointly by all the 
Arctic nations for them to have real impact. The shortage of the Arctic 
Council mandate to deal with issues other than [the] environment has led 
to a situation where decisions are made in isolation creating thus [an] 
incomplete and fragmented framework for the Arctic region.169 
Unless and until the members and permanent participants of the Arctic Council agree to 
expand the scope of regional cooperation through this forum, this institution will never 
serve as a credible and effective dispute resolution mechanism. Given the 2008 statement 
by the five Arctic powers in Ilulissat and the high state of flux in Arctic energy and 
security spheres, it is unlikely that the Arctic Council will be authorized to assume such a 
role anytime soon.     
4. Summary 
International institutions are assuming a greater role in Arctic affairs, each 
offering dispute resolution mechanisms covering various issues of concern to regional 
states and their peoples. The UNCLOS provides channels for arbitration over territorial 
disputes arising from competing claims to economic resources. The NATO-Russia 
Council has professed an interest in maintaining military stability and security in its area 
of responsibility by serving as a vehicle for crisis management, trust-building cooperative 
measures, and open dialogue between former political-military rivals. The Arctic 
Council, meanwhile, focuses primarily on creating a regime for the protection of the 
environment, maritime safety, and responsible development of the region.   
Contrary to the optimistic notion that these institutions are not only legitimate and 
useful, but also effective, this study has highlighted several critical limitations of these 
fora when it comes to their ability to actually resolve the disputes they are supposed to 
address. Parties to the UNCLOS, for example, are able to declare that they do not 
recognize the authority of its courts of arbitration to settle territorial disputes, and parties 
outside the Convention have no access to these arbitration panels. Within the NRC, the 
Arctic remains an officially unaddressed issue, and the focus of its cooperative or 
mediation activities remains conventional land and air forces operating on or over the 
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European landmass. Moreover, “frozen” conflicts in the Euro-Atlantic region, notably 
with regard to Georgia, have undermined relations between member states as well as the 
legitimacy of the NRC when it is not used for the purposes for which it was established—
specifically conflict avoidance, transparent dialogue, and cooperative solutions to 
common problems. Finally, the scope of the Arctic Council’s mandate is extremely 
limited and specifically does not address military security issues. The institution has been 
further marginalized, even among its own members, when they have chosen to pursue 
economic development and territorial dispute mediation outside the framework of the 
Council.   
Thus, far from being the panacea to maritime conflict in the Arctic, the relevant 
international institutions amount to little more than fora of convenience for the 
advancement of national political objectives and interests to the maximum extent 
possible. When conflicts arise between competing interests and national security is at 
stake, these institutions offer insufficient restraint or incentive to be taken seriously or 
utilized at all for the purpose of mitigating a militarized escalation of the dispute.   
The remaining hope of Arctic peace theorists remains the ability of economic 
interdependence to dampen urges and incentives to resort to force to achieve national 
political objectives.  
B. ECONOMIC INTERDEPENDENCE 
Economic interdependence is the fundamental feature underlying a theory of a 
“capitalist peace” whereby the more robust the trade linkages between two countries are, 
the less incentive they will have to settle disputes through militarized means. This is 
because in attacking or threatening a trading partner, they risk destroying the trade 
relationships and economic engines supplying either country with its current source of 
wealth and therefore power (be it political, military, or economic) and thereby destroying 
or weakening their own ability to pursue their objectives or destroying or weakening the 
objective itself, making the venture moot. According to Erik Gartzke, “states with similar 
interests, or integrated markets, or mutual development and an absence of policy 
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differences are less likely to fight.”170  In the case of Russia and the United States, none 
of these factors obtains decisively. It is unlikely that the economic interests of Russia and 
the United States will dovetail to a sufficient extent to encourage a capitalist peace, and 
integrated markets require robust and diversified economies on both sides of the trade 
balance. As it currently stands, Russia is essentially a petrostate—an exporter of energy 
resources and other raw materials with little additional value added. If economic 
interdependence is to mitigate the threat of militarized conflict over resource disputes, the 
only avenue left is through mutual development despite policy differences.   
 Stephen G. Brooks argues that a developing nation’s need for Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) can serve as a vector for economic interdependence and reduce 
the chances of militarized conflict because aggressive and erratic policies deter potential 
investment and undermine a country’s ability to develop.171  In the previous chapter, 
Russia’s critical reliance on hydrocarbon export rents for economic growth and regime 
sustainment was reviewed. Chad Pate furthers this argument by pointing out how 
Russia’s decaying Soviet infrastructure, lack of indigenous expertise and technology, and 
the extremely high cost of exploiting hydrocarbon deposits in the harsh Arctic 
environment all work against the country in its efforts to independently maintain or 
develop its export capacity and therefore its revenue.172  To that end, Pate argues that, 
“were Russia to initiate a conflict, it would likely harm any prospect that state may have 
for outside assistance in [meeting] its need for hydrocarbon production.”173   
An additional factor to consider in establishing effective economic 
interdependence is the buyer-seller dynamic. In a capitalist system, conflict anywhere 
along a trade route often increases transaction costs as the uncertainty and risk of 
disruption in the provision of goods and services intensify. While this may provide 
increased revenue to the seller in the short-term, it may also cause the buyer to seek more 
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stable alternative sources and markets in the long-term, undercutting the seller’s future 
gains. This dynamic is especially salient in the European-Russian energy relationship. 
Russia’s reliance on hydrocarbon exports for revenue and Europe’s dependence on 
hydrocarbon imports to fuel its own economy provide for a mutually beneficial 
partnership when the trade is balanced.   
Given the relatively high price of oil and gas since Russian President Vladimir 
Putin first took office in 2000, the country has had sufficient capital to invest in 
modernizing its hydrocarbon extraction and transportation infrastructure. Despite the 
financial ability and the practical necessity, significant efforts to modernize this 
infrastructure remain in the talking stage at the moment.174  What Russia continues to 
lack is the requisite expertise and technology to explore and develop known and potential 
reserves in the Arctic region. This is particularly so due to concerns that extraction from 
existing mature fields elsewhere in Russia could fall 20 per cent by 2020.175  To that end, 
the country has periodically opened up its lucrative energy sector to foreign investors 
with the expectation of gaining both experience and technology in exchange for access to, 
and a reasonable percentage of the profits from the sale of, Russia’s seemingly endless 
supply of gas and oil.    
1. Potential for a Capitalist Peace? 
In 2010, Russia and Norway concluded a treaty delimiting the disputed maritime 
boundary between the two nations that had lasted for four decades and prevented the 
exploitation of one of the Arctic’s known and most valuable deposits of natural gas—the 
Shtokman Field. The agreement entailed a roughly equal division of the disputed areas 
and a further agreement to jointly develop any deposits straddling the new boundary.176  
Unfortunately, after three years of negotiations between Russian, Norwegian, and French 
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stakeholders, the Norwegian firm Statoil decided to write off $336 million which it had 
already invested in the joint venture with Gazprom, conceded its 24 percent stake to the 
Russian company, and walked away from the deal when the deadline to reach an 
agreement had elapsed.177   The reason was twofold—neither good for future Russian 
FDI prospects. First, the “rising costs and falling prices made its development no longer 
feasible…[T]he 2008 financial crisis combined with an influx of new LNG [Liquefied 
Natural Gas suppliers] and a boom in shale gas production in the U.S. to slash demand 
for gas in Europe, Gazprom’s main market.”178  Secondly, according to Vladimir Milov, 
a former Russian deputy energy minister, “Gazprom wanted to control completely all 
decision-making and saw the partners as playing a secondary role that just brought in 
money and technology. It is clear that this scheme did not suit the foreigners.”179 
Elsewhere, in late 2011, ExxonMobil concluded a joint deal with the Russian 
government-owned oil company Rosneft wherein the American company obtained a 33.3 
percent stake in the development of potential deposits in the Kara Sea in exchange for 
partial Rosneft ownership of ExxonMobil assets in Texas and the Gulf of Mexico.180  In 
addition, Rosneft and ExxonMobil will establish a joint Arctic Research and Design 
Center for Offshore Development (ARC) in St. Petersburg to develop state-of-the-art 
technology to drill in the extreme Arctic conditions with adequate environmental safety 
precautions, and they will also commence an exchange program for managerial and 
technical engineers to gain practical experience in deep sea drilling in ExxonMobil 
locations around the world.181   According to ExxonMobil Chairman and CEO, Rex 
Tillerson, “This agreement takes our relationship to a new level and will create 
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substantial value for both companies. The agreement will be a basis for constructive 
dialog with the Government of the Russian Federation on establishment of a fiscal regime 
for offshore operation consistent with best global practices.”182  It remains to be seen 
how long this new strategic cooperation partnership will last. As Thomas Whipple of the 
Association for the Study of Peak-Oil and Gas-USA notes, “Moscow’s policies towards 
foreign oil companies operating in their country are mercurial at best.”183   
2. Past Precedent as a Deterrence for FDI and Interdependence 
In 1994, then-Russian President Boris Yeltsin gave his approval for a joint 
venture to establish an LNG plant on Sakhalin Island—the country’s first, and a major 
component of its energy strategy. By 2006, Royal Dutch Shell had acquired a 62.5 
percent stake in the venture and spent over $20 billion in constructing and rerouting 
pipelines to comply with ever-changing Russian environmental and political 
requirements.184  After several increases in the cost estimate for the project and a failure 
of the Russians to gain a significant or controlling stake, the Russian government, 
notorious for its lack of environmental concern,185 took a cue from charges by a “non-
governmental” watchdog called Rosprirodnadzor and shut down further production (now 
that the project was 75 to 80% complete) for violations of the Russian criminal code in a 
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campaign designed “to force the international oil companies (IOCs) to revise the terms of 
their investments to allow greater Russian participation in their projects.”186  In 
December 2006, Shell finally succumbed to Russian political pressure and gave Gazprom 
a controlling stake in the joint venture; suddenly all the environmental and criminal 
charges disappeared.187  With this success under his belt, President Putin went after other 
foreign-majority ventures operating in Russia in an attempt to amalgamate Russia’s 
strategic resources under state control.   
TNK-BP, a joint venture by British Petroleum and the Russian firm Tyumen 
Neftegaz Company, secured a license from the Russian government in 1997 to develop 
the Kovykta gas field in eastern Siberia and produce nine billion cubic meters of gas per 
year by 2006.188  In June 2007, President Putin had reportedly “run out of patience” with 
TNK-BP’s underperformance. According to Reuters, “State pressure on Kovykta has 
been repeatedly interpreted as a move to force the Russian partners to sell out so that 
Gazprom, or state-controlled oil major Rosneft, becomes a partner of BP…Putin declined 
direct comment on this issue, saying only that his experience was telling him that a 50/50 
ownership split was not ideal to take the business forward.”189  By March 2011, financial 
difficulties and Kremlin threats to revoke TNK-BP’s license forced the venture to declare 
bankruptcy and auction off its shares in the project to Gazprom, whose earlier 
intervention had prevented TNK-BP from expanding Kovykta production to meet its 
license obligations in the first place.190  Unlike Shell, however, TNK-BP was able to at 
least recoup its investment through the auction.   
The political intimidation and coercion do not stop with the companies. The 
government has also gone after key foreign businessmen operating in Russia in order to 
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remind them that within the country, Russian interests are paramount. In 2008, then-
President of TNK-BP Bob Dudely was forced to flee the country when his visa was not 
renewed, but he continued to run the company from a secret location outside of Russia. 
Shortly thereafter, “BP’s technical staff was barred from working in Russia by a Siberian 
court. The security service, the FSB, twice raided TNK-BP’s offices in 
Moscow…[Dudely] resigned in December 2008,” in effect turning the venture over to his 
Russian partners.191   
Finally, an unbalanced trade relationship creates insecurity by generating 
conditions for economic extortion: using the imbalance as a political tool to compel a 
desired response from the weaker or dependent partner. In 2007, Cindy Hurst, a political-
military research analyst with the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, 
accurately predicted that Russia’s growing energy monopoly and economic independence 
would give it:  
[1] Increased political leverage…The Kremlin will undoubtedly be able to 
use its tightening grip over natural gas as political leverage over countries 
highly dependent on it for this resource.  [2] A strengthening of its 
military. Russia is using energy as a tool to restore its world-power status. 
No longer a military threat, Russia could use the monies earned from these 
development projects to revamp its military.  [3] Unfair control over 
pricing. Russia could opt at any time to increase its prices for natural gas 
during times of high demand. This not only would affect citizens of other 
countries but also could impact local economies or even global economies 
if the increases were substantial.192   
The consequences of the 2006, 2008, and 2009 gas disputes between Russia and 
Ukraine exposed the trade imbalance with its neighbors as a potent political weapon in 
Russia’s favor which it repeatedly used to extract concessions from the lesser partner or 
to compel action in accordance with Russia’s interests. The gas disputes also highlighted 
Europe’s own critical reliance on Russian energy to meet its economic needs. Meanwhile, 
Russia has taken several prudent moves to lessen its own economic dependency on 
others—particularly the West. Russia has begun to diversify its own export markets to 
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compensate for a decreasing demand in Europe by expanding pipeline infrastructure into 
China, all the while blocking efforts by European nations to diversify their own energy 
supply by courting the energy-rich Central Asian states. Additionally, in a rare exhibition 
of judicious financial management, President Putin used increased rents from the boom in 
oil prices to pay off Russia’s sovereign debt. By 2005, Russia was free and clear of its 
debt to the IMF, and by 2008 it had amassed $600 billion in foreign currency reserves 
which were largely responsible for helping Russia ride out the 2008 financial crisis that 
significantly depressed other national economies.193  This financial independence allows 
Russia considerable autonomy to act in its own economic interests without concern for 
those of its partners, competitors, or rivals.   
3. A Case Study: The Sino-Japanese East China Sea Dispute 
While a “capitalist peace” through economic interdependence may be appealing 
in theory, in reality it neither holds any weight with national decision-makers nor does it 
prevent conflicts from escalating significantly, even when two quarreling nations are 
highly reliant on each other economically. In September 2012, the Japanese government 
announced that it had purchased three highly contested islands in the East China Sea from 
a private owner.194  This act provoked widespread nationalist outrage in China, and Sino-
Japanese tensions over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea 
escalated to unprecedented levels with both sides dispatching naval, coast guard, and 
civilian vessels to the area in order to demonstrate their resolve to protect “their 
territory.”195   
This deliberate display of force did not result in a use of force, but with numerous 
ships from government agencies and private businesses of three separate states (including 
Taiwan) all converging in a small area, the potential for an incident cannot be 
                                                 
193 Clifford D. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, “Russia after the Global Financial Crisis,” Eurasian 
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194 Newsroom America, “Island Dispute between China, Japan Escalates,” September 12, 2012, 
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overlooked—especially when territorial claims such as those in the East and South China 
Seas are reinforced by deep-seated and emotionally charged nationalist sentiment on all 
sides. A ramming incident on the high-seas could escalate beyond a government’s ability 
to maintain a measured brinksmanship. Indeed, such sentiment was manifest in violent 
protests throughout mainland China as civilians burned, looted, and destroyed private 
Japanese businesses.196  As a result, several major Japanese firms were forced to 
temporarily suspend operations in China, and Japanese firms saw losses on the stock 
market of up to seven percent.197  The fact that an active naval and law enforcement 
presence was required attests to the failure of diplomacy and multilateral institutions to 
address territorial disputes. On such issues, economics hold little sway.   
According to the Japanese Statistics Bureau, bilateral trade with China in 2011 
accounted for “20 percent of Japan’s total value and China is the largest trade partner of 
Japan.”198  Likewise, Japan is China’s number three trading partner.199  Yet despite these 
close and significant economic linkages, both sides readily committed to an escalation of 
tensions for political purposes. There is no empirical evidence, therefore, to suggest that 
economic interdependence will necessarily have any deterring effect in an escalation of 
tensions over disputed territory in the Arctic.   
In contrast to China and Japan, Russia and the United States share far weaker 
economic ties. As reported by the Congressional Research Service, “Russia accounted for 
1.6% of U.S. imports and 0.6% of U.S. exports in 2011, and the United States accounted 
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for 3.3% of Russian exports and 5.3% of Russian imports.”200  In addition, U.S. 
legislation (particularly the Jackson-Vanik amendment to Title IV of the Trade Act of 
1974), disputes over poultry preparation standards and protection of intellectual property 
rights, as well as concerns over Russian economic policies and regulations all serve to 
stifle any growth in bilateral trade between these two countries.201   
4. Summary 
In order for FDI to work as a disincentive for conflict, a country must first attract 
sufficient foreign investment. It must be willing to allow FDI under conditions 
adequately conducive for a foreign company to make a reasonable profit and to establish 
effective laws that protect the property rights of that company while maintaining 
transparency and constancy. By these metrics, Russia hardly constitutes a reliable, fair, 
and predictable partner. While foreign businesses continue to seek investment 
opportunities in Russia, it remains a risky venture. As Cindy Hurst sums up,  
Russia’s reneging on international deals creates a challenging and 
dangerous business environment for potential Western business 
partners…Although Russian technology has been improving over time, it 
has yet to achieve the same capability as that of the Western majors. 
Knowing this, Western companies might still find future deals attractive. 
These companies need to be shrewd in their business dealings with Russia, 
keeping in mind that at any time the tide can turn and politics can play a 
key role in ousting them from part or all of a project. This could result in 
billions of dollars in lost revenues.202   
In other words, the foundations for a credible, effective economic interdependence with 
Russia simply do not exist and therefore a “capitalist peace” argument against conflict in 
the Arctic is not persuasive.   
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D. CONCLUSION  
The primary argument against the potential for conflict in the Arctic is that 
political leaders are appealing to international institutions to resolve disputes before they 
become militarized. A corollary to this argument is that, via the trappings of economic 
interdependence, Russia’s need for advanced technology to locate and exploit its 
potentially vast reserves of hydrocarbons will sufficiently weigh in Moscow’s political 
calculus to prevent Russia from taking militarized action against neighbors to defend its 
political-economic claims in the region. Given the reality of political objectives, actions, 
and intentions, coupled with the dearth of reliably interdependent economic ties, this 
chapter has exposed these “mitigating factors” against conflict as little more than wishful 
thinking.     
While it is undeniable that the Arctic states are using international institutions 
focused on Arctic issues, they appear to do so out of political convenience—not out of a 
commitment to peaceful cooperation. The participating nations all actively pursue a 
combined environmental and safety agenda with their partners through the Arctic 
Council. Its charter, however, explicitly bans the organization from discussing issues 
related to military security, a point reinforced by the Ilulissat Declaration of the five 
Arctic states: that no legal enforcement regime other than the UNCLOS is needed in the 
region.   
To that end, the UNCLOS does indeed provide conflict resolution mechanisms for 
territorial disputes and continental shelf claims, but Russia exempted itself from 
discussing such matters in UNCLOS fora when it acceded to the Convention. Moreover, 
while the United States continues to observe the UNCLOS as customary international 
law, it remains outside the Convention and is unable and unwilling to use its dispute 
resolution mechanisms.203   
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The NATO-Russia Council is likewise an ineffective avenue for conflict 
resolution, as the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 clearly demonstrated. The NRC 
was not utilized before, during, or after the event as a mechanism to preserve peace and 
stability in the greater Eurasian region. As concerns the Arctic, the region is not a focus 
for the Alliance; and given Canadian resistance, it is unlikely to become one any time 
soon.   
On the economic front, foreign oil and gas companies continue to seek investment 
opportunities in Russia, but the prospects for achieving an interdependence sufficiently 
robust to prevent conflict should disputes arise are clearly poor. As a matter of fact, when 
there is a disagreement, Russia simply takes what it wants and leaves the foreign 
company without any recourse whatsoever. This is the risk that these businesses take 
when attempting to turn a profit in a country with a strong tradition of rule-by-law, vice 
rule-of-law. As then-President Dmitri Medvedev noted in 2008, “Russia is a country 
where people don’t like to observe the law. It is, as they say, a country of legal 
nihilism.”204  Despite efforts to reform the system during his Presidency, political elites 
and public servants alike continue to profit from rampant government corruption and the 
extortion of businessmen.205  In view of Russia’s practice of economic warfare and its 
relative financial independence, Russia is beholden to no one except President Putin, 
while holding its customers hostage. This is hardly a hospitable environment for a 
“capitalist peace” to thrive.   
Thus, rather than being remedies for conflict, international institutions and 
economic interdependence serve only to constrain actions insofar as actors regard them as 
serving their interests. They are effective when all parties agree on an issue, but they do 
not serve as sufficient dispute resolution mechanisms when interests differ. Nor do 
economic ties serve as sufficient deterrence against an escalation of conflict in a political 
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calculus. In such cases, a history of resorting to armed conflict only serves to aggravate 












“Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?” said Alice to 
the Cheshire Cat. 
 “That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,” said the Cat. 
 
—Lewis Carroll,  
Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland206 
 
There is ample reason and precedent suggesting that countries will resort to armed 
conflict to secure their interests, especially when those interests are regarded as vital to 
their national security. While war in the Arctic appears unlikely at present, this thesis has 
analyzed why an escalation of territorial and resource disputes in the Arctic up to and 
including the use of force cannot and should not be ruled out.  The potential for U.S.-
Russian maritime conflict in the region is genuine.   
A. SUMMARY OF THE THREAT 
Opportunity, capability, and perceived intent on their own do not cause conflict, 
but they do serve to increase anxiety about an apparent threat to national interests. It is 
when these three factors combine that the potential for conflict emerges. All that remains 
for an otherwise benign event to quickly escalate into a militarized interstate dispute is a 
sufficient motive or misunderstanding. In the fog before war, an ostensibly banal event 
could quickly escalate into a political power play between navies in the presence of 
historical mistrust, a perception of vulnerability, and nationalist sentiment.   
In the Arctic, such motives include Russia’s critical reliance on hydrocarbon 
resources to maintain its political and economic stability, and therefore its national 
security. For the United States and its NATO allies, the need to maintain and credibly 
defend their sovereignty and their own economic interests provides ample incentive to act 
decisively, if necessary. When national security is challenged or threatened by another 
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power, the potential for militarized conflict can quickly become an actual conflict. 
Despite the sub-zero physical climate, the Arctic is a hotbed of competing interests.   
Receding ice cover in the northern cryosphere presents Arctic nations, and others, 
with considerable economic opportunities. Whether to exploit a potential “treasure trove” 
of natural resources or simply to capitalize on time- and money-saving transportation 
routes, political leaders are under increasing pressure to resolve previously frozen or 
otherwise insignificant disputes and make these resources available as soon as possible to 
their constituents. Lack of resolution is bad for business: it creates a “wild west” (or, in 
this case, a no-law north) of uncertainty as to the legal standing of enterprises and 
exposes countries and companies alike to unnecessary harassment and possible 
prosecution by rival interests.   
Increasing economic opportunities go hand-in-hand with an increased presence in 
the region, creating an environment for potential conflict. Economic expansion is 
triggering an associated build-up in military and law enforcement capability in order to 
protect, defend, and regulate interests and claims. If economic encroachment were not 
enough to cause anxiety among the Arctic powers, the subsequent militarization of the 
Arctic has also caused alarm, making countries feel increasingly vulnerable to 
conventional military pressure from a previously ice-obstructed front.   
At present, only Russia is capable of defending its claims in the Arctic militarily. 
Given Russia’s economic dependence on hydrocarbon resources—which the Arctic 
promises to offer in abundance—Moscow’s economic claims in excess of its recognized 
EEZ are likely to encroach on, or overlap with, the legitimate claims of neighbors. But it 
stands alone. Russia’s overwhelming might in this domain may eventually make “right” 
in its favor if NATO is unable to deter assertive uses of force similar to those to which 
the Russian Coast Guard continually subjects Japan near the Kuril Islands. Any loss in 
this regard would be much more damaging to NATO’s deterrence credibility than its 
current inaction.   
Unless Canada, Denmark, Norway and the United States can come together under 
the NATO banner and make the Arctic a centerpiece of the Alliance’s collective defense 
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agenda for the twenty-first century, they each risk standing alone in the Arctic as well, 
and with a significantly smaller troop-to-task capability than their geopolitical rival. 
Simon Ollivant’s 1984 warning of the dangers of internal dispute within the Alliance is 
perhaps even more salient today. Analyzing the effects of the latest developments in 
military technology, force dispositions, and resource and sovereignty claims on the 
military stability of the region, Ollivant concluded that the greatest dangers to NATO 
unity were an unbalanced American hegemony in the region and increased political 
conflict among allied members over contested economic interests in the region.207  
Denmark and Canada have yet to officially resolve their dispute over Hans Island. 
Canada and the United States continue to argue over the legal status of the Northwest 
Passage and the Beaufort Sea. Either one of these disputes could undermine decades of 
Alliance cohesion.   
Meanwhile, Russia’s actions and rhetoric in the Arctic leave no room to deduce 
anything but a firm and committed intent on the part of its leadership to secure its claims. 
There have been scant, if any, peaceful actions undertaken by the Putin and Medvedev 
administrations to back up their peace-seeking rhetoric. Calls for diplomatic resolution of 
territorial disputes in the Arctic and for working “within existing international 
agreements and mechanisms” have only been operationalized through agreements to 
cooperate on search and rescue efforts and on (competitive) scientific exploration and 
research for submission to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS), a forum that has no binding authority to settle such disputes. All the while, 
however, Russia’s ambitious militarization of the Arctic has been clearly reinforced with 
explicit rhetoric proclaiming its intent to defend its national security interests. For Russia, 
the natural resources in the Arctic are a national security asset of strategic importance.   
Canada, too, beats the drum of sovereign defense in the Arctic. Though its 
rhetoric is significantly less militaristic than that of Russia, it is nevertheless increasingly 
nationalistic. Actions, in this case, speak for themselves. The Canadians have expressed 
an intention to build up forces in the region to the extent necessary to defend their 
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sovereignty. If Prime Minister Stephen Harper had his way, this build-up would be 
happening more quickly than it has been. Indeed, financial constraints constitute the only 
reason that the four NATO countries in the Arctic have not been building up their Arctic 
capabilities more rapidly. 
The bottom line is that the intent of the Arctic nations to defend their regional and 
broader security interests is real. The capabilities, while in some cases only planned or 
very slowly coming into service, are materializing, and the economic opportunity has 
never been greater and will only increase in the future. The threat of a militarized conflict 
in the Arctic is therefore real as well.   
B.  ANALYZING THE EQUATION 
This thesis has examined several factors which, in aggregate, serve to increase the 
potential for, and likelihood of, maritime conflict in the Arctic. What follows is a review 
of the methodology used to assess this likelihood. Subsequently, six factors are analyzed, 
including an assessment of the extent to which these variables affect the likelihood of 
maritime conflict in the Arctic and a systematic overview of key points made in this 
thesis as they relate to these factors.   
As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, six factors are assessed based on 
the facts presented herein and assigned a value reflecting the significance of these factors 
in increasing the likelihood of conflict on an ordinal scale of HIGH (2), MEDIUM (1), 
and LOW (0), except in the cases of the role of international institutions and the degree of 
economic interdependence, where the values assigned are reversed (i.e., LOW = 2, 
MEDIUM = 1, and HIGH = 0). Russia and the United States are scored separately. 
However, where the effects of alliances or other external security interests are concerned, 
such values are marked with an asterisk (*) indicating that this score is higher than it 
would be if the impact of a particular variable on a country were considered in isolation. 
The higher the cumulative value of all the variables, the higher the likelihood that conflict 
in the Arctic will occur.   The maximum score possible, therefore, is 24, indicating that 
conflict in the Arctic is extremely likely. The minimum score possible is 0, indicating that 
there is no possibility of conflict in the Arctic.   
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Table 2 provides a summary of the values assigned to these six factors for Russia 
and the United States. Most importantly, Table 3 provides an aggregate score and its 
correlate assessment for the likelihood of maritime conflict in the Arctic, based on the 
Matrix in Table 1.   
1. Degree of Economic Dependence on Hydrocarbon Resources in the 
Arctic (and Elsewhere) 
For Russia – HIGH (2); for the United States – LOW (0) 
While estimates vary widely, they generally indicate that 35 to 50 percent of the 
Russian federal budget derives directly from hydrocarbon export taxes and sales.208  This 
has direct implications for Russia’s political, economic, military, and social stability and 
therefore for its sense of security or threat. Contrary to the hopes that the rapid economic 
growth in Russia during President Putin’s first two terms in office (2000–2008) was 
proof that the economy was diversifying away from a dependence on oil, subsequent 
analysis has exposed the magnitude and scope of Russian dependence as a critical 
vulnerability of the state. This reliance on natural resources is probably a key reason that, 
in the latest Russian Arctic Strategy, they were described as a strategic resource for 
national security.209  The Russian government has made explicit its intention to use 
military might to defend its Arctic claims, if necessary. As it stands, Russia has been 
unable to secure the technology and expertise necessary to exploit most of its uncontested 
Arctic resources. If, as predicted, Russia’s currently exploited oil and gas fields in Siberia 
and the Far East begin to decline in output by 2020, funding for government operations, 
including defense activities and procurement, would be drastically diminished, and this 
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would probably stimulate the country’s historical paranoia of encirclement and weakness. 
In these circumstances, even benign and unrelated events might easily be construed as a 
threat and trigger a defensive response from Moscow.   Alternatively, a loss of market 
share or a decrease in market value for its exported commodities could also shrink 
Russia’s revenue. 
To that extent, one of the unanticipated consequences of Russia’s economic 
warfare against Ukraine in 2006, 2008 and 2009 was to expose the critical vulnerability 
of several European nations to Russian political will due to their own dependence on 
Russia as an energy resource provider. As a result, the European Union has begun 
seeking alternative sources of energy, which Russia has sought to disrupt or block 
whenever possible, especially with its Central Asian neighbors. Meanwhile, Russia is 
attempting to secure these resources for itself and to diversify its own export markets in 
Asia to compensate for any loss in Europe.    
Unlike Russia, neither Canada, Denmark, Norway, nor the United States is so 
critically dependent on Arctic hydrocarbon resources (or Russian exports thereof) that a 
failure to secure its claims could lead to political instability. Political and social interests, 
however, could nevertheless motivate a military resolution for these countries for other 
reasons.   
2. Value of Contested Claims 
For Russia – HIGH (2); for the United States – MEDIUM (1)* 
In total, Russia stands to obtain rights over approximately five billion tons of fuel 
equivalent, according to the Russian Minister of Natural Resources, Yury Trutnev.210  At 
a rate of approximately $100 per barrel, this equates to a potential revenue of $350 
trillion over the life of such deposits. The United States Geological Survey estimates that 
the probability of finding at least one hydrocarbon field with recoverable resources of at 
least 50 million barrels of oil equivalent in the vicinity of the Lomonosov Ridge is less 
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than 30 percent and estimates that there is probably only about 2.5 billion barrels of oil 
equivalent in that area (vice the approximately 35 billion barrels in the Russian 
estimate).211 
Nevertheless, according to Dmitry Medvedev, then the Russian President, the sale 
of Arctic resources alone already “accounts for around 20 percent of Russia’s gross 
domestic product and 22 percent of [its] national exports.”212  As the oil and gas deposits 
of Western Siberia are depleted over the next ten to fifteen years, Moscow will be forced 
to rely increasingly on the potential reserves in the Arctic to compensate for this loss and 
to stabilize the dynamics of its intractable reliance on hydrocarbon resources to fund its 
national security and government operations. This dynamic serves as a significant driver 
of Moscow’s motivation to press for as large a territorial claim in the Arctic as possible.   
Whereas the value of Arctic claims in terms of security is economic and financial 
for Russia, the value is social and political for the more-developed NATO Arctic states. 
The only contested claim between Russia and the United States in the Arctic is the 
unofficially recognized status of the Maritime Boundary in the Bering and Chukchi Seas 
on the part of Russia. The U.S. Coast Guard frequently interdicts Russian commercial 
vessels poaching in the U.S. EEZ. This poaching has already led to several incidents of 
low-level conflict. Due to the U.S. Coast Guard’s lack of available assets to adequately 
accomplish this mission, Russian commercial vessels simply exploit the numerous gaps 
in U.S. law enforcement presence, increasing the potential for future altercations unless 
and until a politically recognized and enforced agreement can be reached.   
The economic dispute between Canada and the United States in the Beaufort Sea 
is unlikely to erupt into militarized conflict between the two allies, and any disagreements 
will probably be settled at the diplomatic level. Arctic resources are an economic “nice-
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to-have” for these countries, but they are not an imperative in either the public or private 
sector. The ongoing dispute over the status of the Northwest Passage, however, does have 
the potential of becoming militarized, especially when considering the possibility that 
Canadian nationalistic sentiment could turn concerns over sovereignty and environmental 
protection into political pressure to defend Canadian interests in the region against U.S., 
European, and other economic actors’ recognition of the passage as international waters. 
To that end, the United States has demonstrated a willingness to use law enforcement 
vessels to maintain this claim, even at the risk of political discord between the two allies. 
As the Northwest Passage continues to be open for commercial activity for longer and 
more stable periods of time, U.S. economic interests are likely to press for the 
maintenance of the U.S. government position that the waterway constitutes international 
waters, possibly leading to future “freedom of navigation” transits by U.S. law 
enforcement or naval vessels. The confrontation between China and Japan over the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku islands demonstrates the potential role of nationalist sentiment and 
political posturing in rapidly militarizing an otherwise diplomatic issue.   
Meanwhile, the disputed economic claims between Canada, Denmark, and Russia 
over the ownership of the Lomonosov Ridge have the potential to draw in the United 
States to help defend the claims of its allies militarily against Russian assertions if a 
negotiated settlement cannot be reached. In the short-term, however, none of the NATO 
members has a sufficient maritime capacity to defend its claims in the Arctic.   
3. Ability to Defend Claims  
For Russia – HIGH (2); for the United States – LOW (0) 
With the largest Arctic fleet in the world, both in terms of military assets and 
icebreaking support vessels, Russia is well-positioned to back up its policy with action. In 
addition to bolstering their maritime presence in the Arctic, the Russians have also 
increased their air and ground force presence in the region—further increasing NATO’s 
uneasiness that Moscow is re-militarizing the Arctic. In July 2012, Vladimir Putin, in his 
capacity as President, announced that he expected to increase Russia’s naval order of 
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battle by 51 units by 2020, and that many of these units would be based in the Arctic.213  
The nuclear capability of several of Russia’s icebreakers gives its fleet a wide margin of 
range and maneuverability, making access to its most distant claims logistically feasible, 
and defense thereof possible.   
NATO’s Arctic members are currently limited in their ability to operate in the 
Arctic in terms of both maneuverability (far fewer icebreakers or ice-capable patrol 
vessels) and defensive posture. Whereas Russia has a strategic base in the Arctic and its 
units operate regularly in icy conditions as a matter of course, only Canada is actively 
discussing the development of a deep-water Arctic port to sustain its northern 
engagement strategy. In addition to Canada’s current fleet of six Arctic-capable 
icebreakers, plans are already underway to build at least one new one (to be ready by 
2017), as well as six to eight new ice-capable armed patrol vessels (based on the 
Norwegian Svalbard Class) for patrolling the “internal” waters of Canada’s claimed 
archipelago year round. Until these ships are commissioned (in 2015 at the earliest), the 
Canadian Navy is only able to patrol the Arctic in the spring, summer, and autumn when 
there is no ice cover.   For its part, the United States is without effective defense or 
adequate law enforcement footing in the Arctic, even within its uncontested Arctic EEZ. 
The United States has only one operational icebreaker, and it is incapable of operating 
independently in heavy ice conditions. Even with icebreaking assistance from its allies, 
though, the U.S. Navy’s surface fleet lacks sufficient training, experience, and doctrine 
for operating in the region.   
Nevertheless, an arms competition is beginning in the Arctic. While its pace is 
likely to be slow and the underlying intention may very well be to ensure an effective 
constabulary presence in the region as these waters open up to increased activity and 
exploitation, past uses of force to achieve national security objectives only heighten 
tensions over disputed jurisdictions and fears of encroachment, and increase the 
perception on both sides that conflict is more likely.   
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4. Historical Propensity for Militarized Conflict 
For Russia – HIGH (2); for the United States – HIGH (2) 
The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 serve 
as primary evidence for both countries that the other is willing and able to intervene 
militarily in a region when national security is perceived to be at stake. In addition to 
these recent full scale wars, Russia and the United States have both resorted to shows and 
uses of forces in disputes over natural resources. Russia’s heavy-handed tactics against 
Japanese fishing vessels near the Kuril Islands have escalated to the point of shots being 
fired and even resulted in a casualty. The United States actively prosecutes poachers in its 
EEZ and has historically seized Russian vessels engaged in illegal fishing in U.S.-
claimed waters.   
Beyond the Russian and American propensity to engage in militarized interstate 
disputes, other nations have also shown a willingness to use force short of war to achieve 
their political objectives. Most notably, China and Japan have both historically used force 
and have recently escalated their disputes to shows of force in the East China Sea in their 
efforts to secure both land and maritime resources. Furthermore, China has even resorted 
to uses of force in the South China Sea to obtain its objectives and secure resource 
claims.214  In all these cases, neither international institutions, nor economic 
interdependence have restrained countries from taking military action.215   
                                                 
214 James Hookway, “Philippine Warship in Standoff with China Vessels,” The Wall Street Journal, 
April 11, 2012, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303815404577336550439399694.html?mod=googlenews.    
As recently as April 12, 2012, Chinese and Philippine maritime vessels had “engaged each other after the 
Philippine vessel…attempted to arrest the crew of several Chinese fishing boats who were anchored at 
Scarborough Shoal, off the Philippines’ northwest coast but which is also claimed by China. The Philippine 
government said Chinese surveillance vessels intervened to prevent any arrests, leading to the standoff, and 
that Filipino sailors who inspected the Chinese vessels on Tuesday found illegally collected corals and live 
sharks in one of the fishing boats.” 
 215 Of course, there is something to be said for theories of nuclear deterrence. While it can be 
argued that nuclear-capable state dyads have not historically tended to engage each other directly, even in 
low-level conflict, there is precedent: in 1969, the Soviet Union and a newly nuclear-capable China 
engaged in several border clashes that resulted in over 100 casualties. A nuclear deterrent, therefore, is only 
effective in reducing the likelihood that a full-scale, existential war might erupt. Both Russia and the 
United States essentially follow a “no first-use” policy with regard to nuclear weapons. It is reasonable to 
assume, therefore, that any conflict between these two dyads would necessarily involve a series of 
escalations in the conventional realm well before the use of nuclear weapons was considered.   
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5. Role of International Institutions 
For Russia – LOW (2); for the United States – MEDIUM (1) 
While it is undeniable that the Arctic states are using international institutions 
focused on Arctic issues, they appear to do so out of political convenience—not out of a 
commitment to peaceful cooperation. The participating nations all actively pursue a 
combined environmental and safety agenda with their partners through the Arctic 
Council. Its charter, however, explicitly bans the organization from discussing issues 
related to military security, a point reinforced by the Ilulissat Declaration of the five 
Arctic states: that is, no legal enforcement regime other than the UNCLOS is needed in 
the region.216    
To that end, the UNCLOS does indeed provide conflict resolution mechanisms for 
territorial disputes and continental shelf claims, but Russia exempted itself from 
discussing such matters in UNCLOS fora when it acceded to the Convention. Moreover, 
while the United States continues to observe the UNCLOS as customary international 
law, it remains outside the Convention and is unable and unwilling to use its dispute 
resolution mechanisms.   
The NATO-Russia Council is likewise an ineffective instrument for conflict 
resolution, as the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 clearly demonstrated. The NRC 
was not effectively utilized before, during, or after the event as a mechanism to preserve 
peace and stability in the southern Caucasus or the greater Eurasian region. As concerns 
the Arctic, the region is not a focus for the Alliance; and given Canadian resistance, it is 
unlikely to become one any time soon.   
6. Degree of Economic Interdependence 
For Russia – LOW (2); for the United States – LOW (2) 
On the economic front, foreign oil and gas companies continue to seek investment 
opportunities in Russia, but the prospects for achieving an interdependence sufficiently 
                                                 
216 “The Ilulissat Declaration,” May 28, 2008, 
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf.   
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robust to prevent conflict should disputes arise are clearly poor. As the recent Sino-
Japanese example demonstrates, despite close and significant economic linkages, both 
sides readily committed to an escalation of tensions for political purposes. The United 
States and Russia share far weaker economic ties. What Medvedev aptly called “legal 
nihilism” and rampant government corruption pervade Russia’s interactions with 
international entities. As a matter of fact, when there is a disagreement, Russia simply 
takes what it wants and leaves foreign companies without any recourse whatsoever. This 
is hardly a hospitable environment for a “capitalist peace” to thrive. There is no empirical 
evidence, therefore, to suggest that economic interdependence will necessarily have any 
moderating effect in an escalation of tensions over disputed territory in the Arctic.   
Thus, rather than being reliable remedies for conflict, international institutions 
and economic interdependence serve only to constrain actions insofar as actors regard 
them as serving their interests. They are effective when all parties agree on an issue, but 
they do not serve as sufficient dispute resolution mechanisms when interests differ. Nor 
do economic ties serve as sufficient obstacles to an escalation of conflict in a political 
calculus. In such cases, a history of resorting to armed conflict only serves to aggravate 































TOTAL 12 6 
Table 2.   Aerandir Conflict Assessment Index. Summary of scores assigned to 
Russia and the United States based on the extent to which identified factors contribute to 
the likelihood of maritime conflict in the Arctic.   
 
 SCORE LIKELIHOOD 
AGGREGATE 18 LIKELY 
Table 3.   Aggregate Assessment of Likelihood of Conflict (ref. Table 1).   
C. CONFLICT IN THE ARCTIC  
While not assigning an expected timeframe or event horizon for such an outcome, 
this thesis has sought to examine (a) what factors could increase the risk of a U.S.-
Russian maritime conflict in the Arctic, and (b) what measures the United States—and 
the U.S. Navy in particular—might take to be prepared for deterrence and defense in such 
an eventuality. With an analysis of the six factors discussed in the previous section, one is 
in a better position to gauge the likelihood of a militarized dispute erupting in the Arctic 
and to understand the reasons why. Armed with this insight, policy-makers can make 
more informed decisions as to the allocation and utilization of scarce resources. So, how 
likely is conflict in the Arctic and what should policy-makers do about it? 
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1. Potential for Maritime Conflict in the Arctic 
Based on the methodology established for this analysis, it can be reasonably 
assessed that conflict in the Arctic is likely. To put this another way, with a score of 18 
out of 24 possible points, there is a 75 percent chance that maritime disputes involving 
the United States and Russia will occur in the Arctic necessitating the show or use of 
force to achieve a political objective. It should be reiterated that this assessment is 
acknowledged to be an analytically subjective conclusion and that the intervals of 
measurement are notably coarse. The evidence presented in this analysis, however, 
supports this conclusion. Policy-makers should take care not to discount the physical 
indicators and declared policies of other Arctic nations when judging the seriousness of 
their intent to protect their various claims in the region. Advocates of a “Pax Arctica” 
involving regional cooperation ignore the more pragmatic factors underlying 
international relations and the actual limits of international institutions and economic 
incentives in restraining actors’ behavior in an anarchic system.   
2. Why the United States Should Care: Recommendations for Policy and 
Action 
The prioritization fallacy of politicians assumes a model of fiscal discipline in 
which some aspects of national and collective defense are more important than others and 
thus deserve more immediate attention and funding. In today’s globalized international 
system, economic warfare can be just as costly to a nation as conventional warfare. 
Indeed, adversaries strive to exploit gaps and other weaknesses in defensive strategies, 
rather than to attack a “prioritized” strength head-on. The Arctic may be NATO’s 
Achilles heel. The threat presented by an opening Arctic should be taken more seriously 
by the Alliance’s political leaders. At the same time, it may be NATO’s salvation. The 
region presents the Alliance with its most credible mission since the end of the Cold War 
as a political-military organization—an opportunity to rejuvenate its collective defense 
doctrine in the face of a new form of warfare. To protect itself, the Alliance must act now 
to enhance its (collective) military and (national) law enforcement presence in the region. 
Moreover, the United States should close the gap legally and diplomatically by acceding 
to the UNCLOS. Only a comprehensive approach can ensure that the Alliance’s shared 
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security interests are well-defended in the international arena. An ounce of presence now 
would cost much less than a pound of cure later.   
Economic rivalries aside, the Arctic members of NATO suffer from a large gap 
between their political commitments in the region and their ability to honor them. As the 
Arctic ice continues to recede more quickly every year on average, there is simply no 
time to waste in beginning the construction of the necessary platforms and infrastructure 
to fill this gap before the Arctic states become overwhelmed with regulating commercial 
traffic and conducting defensive patrols. It is this build-up of dual-purpose capabilities, 
however, that serves to feed Russia’s threat perception of a NATO determined to encircle 
and “contain” it. Such a sentiment cannot be ignored when President Putin reiterates it in 
public speeches and pledges to counter this perceived threat by building up Russia’s own 
forces to even out the playing field in the Arctic, even though Russia’s military 
capabilities in the region are already clearly ahead.217  It is therefore pointless for NATO 
allies to worry too much about how their own activities will affect Russia’s political-
military calculus. Given prevailing Russian attitudes, such activity will be framed in a 
NATO vs. Russia context for the foreseeable future. In the meantime, the United States 
and its NATO allies should pursue their own political agendas and focus on strengthening 
their capabilities in the Arctic.   
At present, the United States and its NATO allies as a whole are unable to provide 
the necessary physical surface presence required by Arctic geopolitics. While outsourcing 
some of the U.S. Coast Guard’s missions (such as survey and research) might be 
possible, many of its statutory mandates require that the vessels be owned by the 
government and that the missions be conducted by trained and qualified Coast Guard 
personnel only (for instance, sovereignty operations and law enforcement functions).   
Currently, only one U.S. Coast Guard icebreaker is operational. At least two new ships 
                                                 
217 “It is incomprehensible why it’s [NATO] still around…This [NATO’s presence on Russia’s 
borders] poses genuine threats to our territory. Needless to say, in that case we will have to build our 
defense policy accordingly so as to neutralize these threats.”   
Vladimir Putin, as quoted by RIA Novosti, “Putin Criticizes NATO as Cold War Throwback,” October 5, 
2012, http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20121005/176426452.html.   
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(to make three in total) are necessary to minimally fulfill Coast Guard missions, 
according to a conservative National Academies estimate.218   
The U.S. Coast Guard leadership has taken the issue seriously and continues to 
press Congress for the necessary funds to construct six heavy and four medium 
icebreakers immediately, just to meet the statutory missions of the service. This would 
also bring the combined NATO capability to par with Russia’s Arctic order of battle.   
In the meantime, of the NATO allies in the Arctic only Canada is taking the 
necessary steps to meet the future defense and law enforcement needs presented by an 
opening Arctic region, and then only on a unilateral basis and not as part of a concerted, 
comprehensive Alliance program. Perhaps a rising Canada will take a much-needed 
leadership role in the “True North” and provide the crucial motivation within NATO to 
spur its Arctic allies into action. Given Canada’s present position on the subject, 
however, it is incumbent on the United States, in cooperation with Norway and Denmark, 
to promote a more robust Arctic agenda for the Alliance.     
Finally, all four NATO allies should conduct combined Arctic show-of-force (and 
capability) exercises in the region, not only to practice operating in the environment, but 
also to establish and validate a truly sound doctrine for the collective defense of Arctic 
economic resources and maritime sovereignty.   
3. When Will the Ice Break? 
While it remains outside the scope of this thesis to support predictions of when 
policy-makers can expect conflict to occur in the Arctic, it is fitting to end with some 
brief speculation on the topic in order to frame and guide decisions on how to implement 
the recommendations presented herein.   
There are three separate deadlines which provide an outline for expectations. In 
the immediate short-term, Russia has stated its intention to submit evidence in support of 
its continental shelf claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
                                                 
218 The National Academies, Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs, 
100.   
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(CLCS) by the end of 2012. Due to requirements in the UNCLOS, Canada and Denmark 
must themselves submit their initial claims by November of 2013 and 2014 respectively. 
Once the CLCS has made its determination regarding the validity and delineation of their 
claims, it will be up to the three countries to negotiate delimited boundaries among 
themselves. This process could be quick if there are no contentious findings made by the 
CLCS, but it appears likely that disagreements will occur and lead to the first window for 
conflict in the 2015 to 2020 timeframe as the three nations begin to defend their claims 
more actively by establishing a physical presence in the areas under dispute – laying the 
foundations for a possible determination of historic state practice and opinio juris.   
In the mid-term, the predicted imminent decline in Russian land-based oil and gas 
production will signal the opening of the second window for conflict around 2020 to 
2030. During this period, the Russian government will be under increased pressure to 
locate, secure, and exploit alternative sources of hydrocarbons in order to maintain stable 
revenues for government operations. There is already evidence that Russia’s economy is 
weakening, which could increase the likelihood of conflict in the near- to mid-term as 
fears of domestic unrest and instability lead to increased sensitivities to external events 
and accusations of foreign “meddling” and encirclement. As Charles Clover of the 
Financial Times reports, “Russia’s petrodollar surplus…is poised to vanish as early as 
2015…The eventual transition to a ‘twin deficit economy,’ where both the government 
budget and the external trade balance are negative, will be a rude awakening for Russian 
policy makers.”219  If the “short-term” territorial conflicts have not been resolved by this 
point, Russia can be expected to more forcefully (that is, militarily) defend its excessive 
claims in order to control as many potential deposits of resources as possible. By this 
time, a sufficient number of icebreakers will be required to carry out statutory U.S. Coast 
Guard missions, and a comprehensive Arctic doctrine will need to be worked out for U.S. 
and NATO operations in the region in support of civil authorities and collective defensive 
operations.   
                                                 
219 Charles Clover, “Russia Faces end of Petrodollar Surplus,” Financial Times, October 3, 2012, 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/313c4ffc-0d6e-11e2-bfcb-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2BUBXmMY5.    
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Finally, in the longer term, the gradual opening of Arctic waterways to 
commercial traffic on a seasonal basis by 2030 will increase the need for persistent and 
pervasive constabulary patrols by all Arctic nations in order to regulate this activity. Not 
only will more ice-capable patrol vessels be required, but so too will be a robust logistics 
infrastructure, to include basing, transportation, supply, and communications. This third 
window for conflict in the Arctic will probably occur in the 2030 to 2045 time frame. The 
increase in commercial traffic activity will heighten tensions in U.S.-Canadian relations if 
a political compromise on the status of the Northwest Passage has not been reached, 
keeping in mind that the ultimate status of Russia’s Northeast Passage would be likewise 
affected. As Canada is extremely sensitive to matters of Arctic sovereignty and Russia is 
are unlikely to welcome unrestricted movement through its backyard, it should be 
expected that the same nationalist sentiment that erupted in the Sino-Japanese row over 
the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would likewise be manifest in these cases as well, 
leading to a quick, and potentially intense, confrontation involving the United States, 
Russia, and Canada.     
This thesis has argued that the likelihood of maritime conflict in the Arctic is real 
and credible. There is reason to believe, however, that while conflict is likely, it is not 
inevitable. In the end, the road that one travels is largely determined by the destination 











LIST OF REFERENCES 
Acheson, Chris. “Disputed Claims in the East China Sea: An Interview with James 
Manicom.”  The National Bureau of Asia Research. July 25, 2011.  
http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/PSA/Interview_Maincom.pdf.   
 
Apps, Peter.  “Geopolitics, Resources Put Maritime Disputes Back on Map.”  Reuters, 
October 1, 2012.  http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/01/us-maritime-
disputes-idUSBRE8900BG20121001.   
 
Arctic Council.  “History.”  http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us/history.   
 
———.  “Ottawa Declaration.”  September 19, 1996.  http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/about/documents/file/13-ottawa-declaration.   
 
Arctic Economics.  “United States – Russian Maritime Boundary and Exclusive 
Economic Zones.”  January 11, 2012.  http://arcticecon.wordpress.com/.   
 
———.  “Where is the Beaufort Sea Boundary between the U.S. and Canada?”  August 
26, 2009.  
http://benmuse.typepad.com/arctic_economics/2009/08/us_canada_beaufort_sea_
boundary.html.    
 
Arctic Portal.  “About the Arctic Council.”  http://www.arcticportal.org/arctic-council.   
 
Associated Press.  “Russia to deploy 2 Army Brigades in Arctic.”  July 1, 2011.   
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2011/jul/01/russia-to-deploy-2-army-
brigades-in-arctic/.   
 




Baev, Pavel K.  “From West to South to North: Russia Engages and Challenges Its 
Neighbors.”  International Journal 63, 2 (Spring 2008): 291–305.   
http://www.jstor.org/stable/40204363.    
 
Baker, James and Michael Byers.  “The Beaufort Sea Boundary Dispute: Identifying and 
Assessing Options.”  Michael Byers on Politics. February 25, 2010.  
http://byers.typepad.com/files/baker-byers-discussion-paper-25-feb-2010.pdf.   
 
BBC News.  “Canadians ‘Support More Troops to Defend Arctic Claims.’”  25 January, 
2011.  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-12272312.   
 
 110 
———.  “China Protests: Fears Rise over Japan-China Trade Ties.” September 18, 2012.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19632047.   
 
———.  “China Protests: Japanese Firms Suspend Some Operations.”  September 17, 
2012.  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-19620114.   
 
———.  “Japanese Fisherman Killed by Russians.”  August 16, 2006.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4797021.stm. 
 
———.  “No Progress in China-Japan Talks.”  May 31, 2005.  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4592881.stm.   
 
———.  “Q&A: South China Sea Dispute.”  June 27, 2012.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349.   
 
———.  “Profile: Bob Dudley.”  September  30, 2012.  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-10755184.   
 
Barber, Lionel, Neil Buckley, and Catherine Belton.  “Laying down the law: Medvedev 
vows war on Russia’s ‘legal nihilism.’”  Financial Times, December 24, 2008.  
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/e46ea1d8-c6c8–11dd-97a5–
000077b07658.html#axzz27n6dI9Ob.   
 
Barbieri, Katherine, and Omar Keshk. Correlates of War Project Trade Data Set 
Codebook, Version 3.0 (2012).  
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/Trade/Trade.html.   
 
Belton, Catherine.  “Gazprom Pays $770m for TNK-BP Gas Field.”  Financial Times, 
March 1, 2011.  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1f0c62da-43fe-11e0–8f20–
00144feab49a.html#axzz25nmXEUuZ.   
 
Belton, Catherine, and Guy Chazan.  “Shtokman Exit Shows a Realistic Gazprom.”  
Financial Times, August 29, 2012.  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b6c8cf9c-
f1f8–11e1-bba3–00144feabdc0.html#axzz25nmXEUuZ.   
 
Bennett, Mia.  “Russia, Like Other Arctic States, Solidifies Northern Military Presence.”  
Foreign Policy Association. July 4, 2011.  
http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/07/04/russia-arctic-states-solidifying-







Bird, Kenneth J., Ronald R. Charpentier, Donald L. Gautier, David W. Houseknecht, 
Timothy R. Klett, Janet K. Pitman, Thomas E. Moore, Christopher J. Schenk, 
Marilyn E. Tennyson, and Craig J. Wandrey.  “Circum-Arctic Resource 
Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle.”  
U.S. Geological Survey Fact Sheet 2008–3049 (2008).  
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/.   
 
Blacksmith Institute.  “North Sakhalin.”  
http://www.blacksmithinstitute.org/projects/display/74.   
 
Borgerson, Scott G. Statement before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of 
Representatives. Washington, D.C. March 25, 2009.   
 
Bradshaw, Michael.  “Sakhalin-2 in the Firing Line.”  Pacific Russia Oil and Gas Report 
(Winter 2006): 3–18.  
http://www.geog.le.ac.uk/staff/mjb41/articles/Sakhalin2_in_the_Firing_Line_Env
.pdf.    
 
Brooks, Stephen G. Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and 
the Changing Calculus of Conflict. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007.   
 
Bryanski, Gleb.  “Russia to Get Stronger Nuclear Navy, Putin Says.”  Reuters, July 30, 
2012.  http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/30/us-russia-putin-navy-
idUSBRE86T1D320120730.   
 
Bukharin, Oleg.  “Russia’s Nuclear Icebreaker Fleet.”  Science and Global Security 14 
(2006): 25–31.  http://www.princeton.edu/sgs/publications/sgs/pdf/14_1_25–
31_Bukharin.pdf.   
 
Bush, George W.  “National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD 66 and Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 25.”  The White House. January 9, 2009.   
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-66.htm.   
 
Bynkershoek, Cornelius Van. De Dominio Maris Dissertatio. Translated by Ralph van 
Deman Magoffin. New York: Oxford University Press, 1923. 
 
Byers, Michael.  “Canada Can Help Russia with Northern Sea Route.”  The Moscow 
Times, June 8, 2012.  http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/canada-
can-help-russia-with-northern-sea-route/460127.html.   
 
———. Who Owns the Arctic?: Understanding Sovereignty Disputes in the North. 
Vancouver: D&M Publishers Inc., 2009.   
 
 112 
Byers, Michael and Suzanne Lalonde.  “Who Controls the Northwest Passage?”  
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 42 No. 4 (October 2009), 1133–1210. 
Nashville: Vanderbuilt University, 2009.  
    
Carroll, Lewis. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass. 
London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1961.   
 
CBC News.  “Denmark Defends List of Nations for Arctic Meeting.”  May 20, 2008.  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/north/story/2008/05/20/arctic-meeting.html.   
 
———.  “Harper Announces Northern Deep-Sea Port, Training Site.”  August 11, 2007.  
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2007/08/10/port-north.html.   
 
Le Cercle Polaire, “The (Political) Opening of the Northern Sea Route,” Le Cercle 
Polaire (October 2009), 
http://www.lecerclepolaire.com/En/newsviews/route_du_nord_news.html.   
 
Champion-Smith, Bruce.  “Arctic Sovereignty ‘First Priority’ for North, Says Harper.” 
The Star, August 23, 2010.  
http://www.thestar.com/news/canada/arctic/article/851309--arctic-sovereignty-
first-priority-for-north-says-harper.   
 
Charron, Andrea.  “The Northwest Passage in Context.”  Canadian Ministry of National 
Defense. July 14, 2008.  http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo6/no4/north-nord-02-
eng.asp.   
 
Chazan, Guy, and Catherine Belton.  “Gazprom Freezes Arctic Gas Project.”  Financial 
Times, August 29, 2012.  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ab331568-f1d8–11e1-bba3–
00144feabdc0.html#axzz25TbNBGVU.   
 
Clark, Pilita, and Gillian Tett. “Russia Found Failing on Pollution Curbs.”  Financial 
Times, January 23, 2012.  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f7585e52–45e5–11e1-
acc9–00144feabdc0.html#axzz25nmXEUuZ.   
 
Clover, Charles.  “Russia Faces End of Petrodollar Surplus.”  Financial Times, October 
3, 2012.  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/313c4ffc-0d6e-11e2-bfcb-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2BUBXmMY5.   
 
Cohen, Ariel.  “From Russian Competition to Natural Resources Access: Recasting U.S. 
Arctic Policy.”  Backgrounder, No. 2421 (June 15, 2010).   
 
———.  “Russia in the Arctic: Challenges to U.S. Energy and Geopolitics in the High 
North.”  In Russia in the Arctic. Edited by Stephen J. Blank, 1–42. Carlisle: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2011.  
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB1073.pdf.    
 113 
Coffey, Luke.  “NATO in the Arctic: Challenges and Opportunities.”  Issue Brief No. 
3646. June 22, 2012. The Heritage Foundation.  http://report.heritage.org/ib3646.     
 
Cornell University Law School, Law Information Institute. S.v. “opinio juris.”  
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/opinio_juris_international_law.   
 
Dalvo, Giovanni D.  “Northern Fleet in Russia’s Grand Strategy.”  Window on 
Heartland: Geopolitical notes on Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia 
Blog. June 28, 2012.  http://www.windowonheartland.net/search?updated-
max=2012–07–05T09:02:00%2B02:00&max-results=1&start=1&by-date=false.   
 
Dickie, Mure.  “Senkaku Spat Reinforces Military Rethink.”  Financial Times, 
September 25, 2012.  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ec105b12–06f1–11e2–92ef-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz28AV6GjlD.   
 
Dosch, Jörn.  “The Spratly Islands Dispute: Order-Building on China’s terms?”  Harvard 
International Review. August 18, 2011.  http://hir.harvard.edu/the-spratly-islands-
dispute-order-building-on-china-s-terms.   
 
Dow Jones Newswires.  “Russia Denies Plans to Carry Out ‘Unilateral Partition’ of Oil-
Rich Arctic.”  September 23, 2008.  
http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=67031.   
 
The Economist.  “The Scramble for the Seabed: Suddenly, a Wider World below the 
Waterline.”  May 14, 2009.  http://www.economist.com/node/13649265.    
 
Ekos Research Associates Inc. Rethinking the Top of the World: Arctic Security Public 
Opinion Survey. Toronto: University of Toronto, 2011.  
http://munkschool.utoronto.ca/files/downloads/FINAL%20Survey%20Report.pdf.   
 
European Commission.  “China: Bilateral Trade Statistics.”  March 21, 2012.  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113366.pdf.   
 
Gaddy, Clifford D. and Barry W. Ickes.  “Russia after the Global Financial Crisis.”  
Eurasian Geography and Economics 51, No. 3 (2010): 281–311.  doi: 
10.2747/1539–7216.51.3.281.    
 
Galloway, Gloria.  “Harper Stands Firm on Sovereignty as China eyes Arctic Resources.”  
The Globe and Mail, August 26, 2011.  
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-notebook/harper-stands-
firm-on-sovereignty-as-china-eyes-arctic-resources/article616967/.   
 
Gartzke, Erik.  “The Capitalist Peace.”  American Journal of Political Science 51, no. 1 
(January 2007): 166–191.   
 114 
Gayathri, Amrutha.  “Anti-Japanese Protests Erupts across China; Beijing Raises Trade 
Threats over Disputed Islands.”  International Business Times, September 17, 
2012.  http://www.ibtimes.com/print/anti-japanese-protests-erupts-across-china-
beijing-raises-trade-threats-over-disputed-islands-789678.   
 
GlobalSecurity.org.  “Arctic Ocean.”  
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/arctic.htm.   
 
Ghosn, Faten and Glenn Palmer.  “Codebook for the Militarized Interstate Dispute Data, 
Version 3.10.”  April 14, 2003.   http://www.correlatesofwar.org/.   
 
Ghosn, Faten, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart Bremer.  “MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Dispute 
Narratives, Version 3.0.”   March 25, 2004.  
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/COW2%20Data/MIDs/MID_v3.0.narratives.pdf.   
 
———.  “The MID3 Data Set, 1993–2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description.”  
Conflict Management and Peace Science 21 (2004):133–154, 
http://correlatesofwar.org.    
 
Grove, Thomas.  “Russia Creates Two Brigades of Arctic Troops.”  Reuters, July 1, 
2011.  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/07/01/russia-arctic-troops-
idUKLDE76017D20110701.   
 
———.  “Russia to Submit U.N. Arctic Claim Next Year.”  Reuters, July 7, 2011.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/07/us-russia-arctic-claim-
idUSTRE76528320110707.   
 
Government of Canada. “The John G. Diefenbaker National Icebreaker Project.”  August 
28, 2008.  http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2252.   
 
———.  “Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships.”  January 13, 2012.  
http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/pri/2/pro-pro/artic-eng.asp.   
 
Harding, Luke.  “Vladimir Putin Calls for Arctic Claims to Be Resolved under UN Law.”  




Hookway, James.  “Philippine Warship in Standoff with China Vessels.”  The Wall Street 
Journal, April 11, 2012.  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230381540457733655043939969
4.html?mod=googlenews.   
 
Howard, Roger.  “Russia’s New Front Line.”  Survival 52, 2 (2010): 141–156.  doi: 
10.1080/00396331003764678.   
 115 
Huebert, Rob.  “The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment.”  Canadian Defence 
& Foreign Affairs Institute (March 2010).  
http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%
20Environment.pdf.   
 
Humphreys, Adrian.  “New Proposal Would See Hans Island Split Equally between 
Canada and Denmark.”  National Post, April 11, 2012.  
http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/04/11/new-proposal-would-see-hans-island-
split-equally-between-canada-and-denmark/.   
 
Hurst, Cindy.  “Investment Risky in Russia as Politics Affects Profits.”  Oil and Gas 
Journal 105, no. 27 (July 2007): 18–23.   
 
Ibbitson, John. “Dispute over Hans Island nears Resolution. Now for the Beaufort Sea.”  
The Globe and Mail, January 26, 2011.  
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/dispute-over-hans-island-nears-
resolution-now-for-the-beaufort-sea/article563692/.   
 
IHS Janes.  “Danbjørn Class,” and “Thorbjørn Class.” Janes Fighting Ships (Jane’s 
Information Group, 2011).  http://www.janes.com.  (Accessed March 2, 2012).   
 
——— .  “Navy (Denmark).”  Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment – Western Europe 
(IHS Global Limited, 2012).  http://www.janes.com.  (Accessed March 2, 2012).   
 
“The Ilulissat Declaration.”  May 28, 2008.  
http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf.   
 
Isted, Kathryn.  “Sovereignty in the Arctic: An Analysis of Territorial Disputes & 
Environmental Policy Considerations.”  Journal of Transnational Law & Policy 
18 No. 2 (Spring 2009), 343–376.    Tallahassee: Florida State University, 2009.  
http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/transnational/vol18_2/isted.pdf.   
 
Jackson, William D.  “Encircled Again: Russia’s Military Assesses Threats in a Post-
Soviet World.”  Political Science Quarterly 117, 3 (Autumn 2002): 373–400. 
 
Japan Ministry of Defense. Defense of Japan 2012. Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Defense, 
2012.  http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2012.html.   
 
Kaczynski, Vlad M.  “U.S.-Russian Bering Sea Marine Border Dispute: Conflict over 
Strategic Assets, Fisheries and Energy Resources.”  In Russian Analytical Digest 
20. May 1, 2007.  http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-20–2–5.pdf.   
 
Koivurova, Timo and Kamrul Hossain. Offshore Hydrocarbon: Current Policy Context in 
the Marine Arctic. Arctic Transform Program. September 4, 2008.  http://arctic-
transform.org/download/OffHydBP.pdf.   
 116 
Kovalchuk, Vladislav.  “Russian Oil Sector Taxation: Federal Budget Wealth or Oil 
Sector Health?”  BNP Paribas Investment Partners. December 10, 2011.  
http://www.tkb-
bnpparibasip.info/i_eng/msg_i/140//p1112021_russian_budget__oil_v3.pdf?941.     
 
LaGrone, Sam.  “Todd Pacific Shipyards Wins $16m Icebreaker Modification Contract.”  
Jane’s Navy International (HIS Global Limited, 2011). January 14, 2011.  
http://www.janes.com.  (Accessed March 2, 2012).   
 
Lassere, Frédéric.  “High North Shipping: Myths and Realities.”  In Security Perspectives 
in the High North: Geostrategic Thaw or Freeze? NDC Forum Paper 7. Edited by 
Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, 179–199. Rome: NATO 
Defense College, 2009.   
 
Leitzell, Katherine.  “Is Arctic Sea Ice Back to Normal?”  Arctic Ice News and Analysis. 
National Snow and Ice Data Center. May 29, 2012.  
http://nsidc.org/icelights/2012/05/29/is-arctic-sea-ice-back-to-normal/.   
 
Lindberg, Marten.  “Is NATO taking over the Arctic?”  ISN Blog, August 22, 2012.  
http://isnblog.ethz.ch/international-relations/is-nato-taking-over-the-arctic.   
 
Martins, Sebastião.  “Russia Ramps Up Modernisation of Oil-Refining Sector.”  Oil & 
Gas Technology, August 10, 2012.  http://www.oilandgastechnology.net/business-
strategy/russia-ramps-modernisation-oil-refining-sector.   
 
McRae, Don.  “The Negotiation of Article 234,” in Politics of the Northwest Passage. 
Edited by Franklyn Griffiths. Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1987. 
 
Medvedev, Dmitry.  “Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii v Arktike na 
period do 2020 goda i dal’neishuyu perspektivu.”  Security Council of the 
Russian Federation. September 8, 2008.  
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html.    
 
———.  “Speech at Meeting of the Russian Security Council on Protecting Russia’s 




———.  “Strategiya natsional’noi besopasnosti Rosiiskoi Federatsii do 2020 goda.”  
Security Council of the Russian Federation. May 12, 2009.   





Mehdiyeva, Nazrin.  “The Three Ds: Development, Diversion, and Diversification – 
Reviewing Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2030,” NATO Defense College Research 
Review (November 2011), 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=309.    
 
Ministry of Energy of the Russian Federation.  “Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period 
up to 2030.”  Decree No. 1715-r of the Government of the Russian Federation 
dated 13 November 2009.  http://www.energystrategy.ru/projects/docs/ES-
2030_(Eng).pdf.   
 
Monaghan, Andrew.  “From Lisbon to Munich: Russian Views of NATO-Russia 
Relations.”  NATO Defense College Research Report (February 2011).  
http://www.ndc.nato.int/download/downloads.php?icode=238.   
 
Murphy, Kim.  “Coast Guard Beefs Up Deployment in the U.S. Arctic.”  Los Angeles 
Times, March 1, 2012.  http://www.latimes.com/news/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-
coast-guard-arctic-20120301,0,3177903.story.   
 
National Intelligence Council.  “Scarcity in the Midst of Plenty?”  Global Trends 2025: A 
Transformed World. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2008.  
http://www.aicpa.org/research/cpahorizons2025/globalforces/downloadabledocu
ments/globaltrends.pdf.   
 
National Research Council. “Summary for Congress.” Polar Icebreakers in a Changing 
World: An Assessment of U.S. Needs. Washington, DC: The National Academies 
Press, 2007. 
 
National Snow and Ice Data Center.  “Arctic Ice 101.”  http://nsidc.org/icelights/arctic-
sea-ice/.   
 
———.  “Arctic Sea Ice Shatters All Previous Record Lows.”  
http://nsidc.org/news/press/2007_seaiceminimum/20071001_pressrelease.html.   
 
———.  “Sea Ice Trends in Extent.”  
ftp://sidads.colorado.edu/DATASETS/NOAA/G02135/Sep/N_09_plot.png.   
 
The National Academies. Polar Icebreakers in a Changing World: An Assessment of U.S. 
Needs. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2007.   
 
NATO.  “Bucharest Summit Declaration.”  April 3, 2008.  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.   
 
———.  “NATO-Russia Council.”  October 27, 2010.  
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50091.htm.   
 
 118 
NATO-Russia Council.  “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security 
between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France.”  May 27, 
1997.  http://www.nato-russia-council.info/en/official-documents/official-
document-03/.    
 
Nepolitano, Diana.  “Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation Expert Meeting on 
Oil and Gas Taxation.”  ITIC Bulletin Special Edition. July 2011. Washington, 
DC.   http://www.iea.org/work/2011/tax_russia/Moscow_bulletin.pdf.    
 
Newsroom America.  “Island Dispute between China, Japan Escalates.”  September 12, 
2012.  
http://www.newsroomamerica.com/story/286673/island_dispute_between_china,_
japan_escalates.html.   
 
Northern Oil and Gas Branch of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada. 
“Northern Oil and Gas Annual Report 2011.”  Government of Canada (2012).  
http://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/eng/1335971994893.   
 
Northern Pacific.  “Russia May Lose One Alaska More.”  
http://www.npacific.ru/np/magazin/1–98_e/np5002e.html.   
 
Oceanographer of the Navy. U.S. Navy Arctic Roadmap. Washington, DC: Department of 
the Navy, 2009.  
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/documents/USN_artic_roadmap.pdf.   
 
Ollivant, Simon.  “Arctic Challenge to NATO.”  In Conflict Studies 172. London: The 
Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1984.   
 
O’Rourke, Ronald. Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress. CRS 
Report for Congress, June 15, 2012. Washington, DC: Congressional Research 
Service, 2012.  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41153.pdf.   
 
Pate, Chad P.  “Easing the Arctic Tension: An Economic Solution.”  Master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, December 2010.   
 
Pharand, Donat.  “Freedom of the Seas in the Arctic Ocean.”  The University of Toronto 
Law Journal 19, 2 (Spring, 1969): 210–233.   
 
Putin, Vladimir.  “Being Strong: Why Russia Needs to Rebuild Its Military.”  Foreign 
Affairs. February 21, 2012.  
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/21/being_strong.   
 
Reuters.  “FACTBOX-Key Facts about Russia’s Kovykta Gas Field.”  June 1, 2007.  
http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/01/russia-kovykta-
idUSL0128180320070601.   
 119 
———.  “UPDATE 1-Putin Says Russia Lost Patience with Kovykta Owners.”  June 4, 
2007.  http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/04/russia-kovykta-putin-
idUSL0439713820070604.   
 
RIA Novosti.  “Lomonosov Ridge Could Bring Russia 5 Billion Tons of Extra Fuel.”  
October 4, 2007.  http://www.energy-
daily.com/reports/Lomonosov_Ridge_Could_Bring_Russia_5_Billion_Tons_Of_
Extra_Fuel_999.html.   
 
———.  “Putin Criticizes NATO as Cold War Throwback.”  October 5, 2012.  
http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20121005/176426452.html.   
 
Rosneft.  “Rosneft and ExxonMobil to Join Forces in the Artic and Black Sea Offshore, 
Enhance Co-operation through Technology Sharing and Joint International 
Projects.”  August 30, 2011.  
http://www.rosneft.com/news/pressrelease/30082011.html.   
 
Russett, Bruce. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.   
 
Sapir, Jacques.  “Russia Regional Report: Business as Usual, Despite the Financial 
Crisis.” World Oil Online, 323, No. 1 (January 2011).  
http://www.worldoil.com/Business-as-usual-in-Russia,-despite-the-financial-
crisis-January-2011.html.    
 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Convention on the Law of the Sea. S. Exec. 
Rept. 110–9 (2007).   
 
Statistics Bureau. Statistical Handbook of Japan 2012. Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications, Japan.  http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/index.htm. 
 
Studin, Irvin.  “The Melting of the Polar Ice Signals the End of ‘Pax Arctica.’”  Financial 
Times, August 30, 2012.  http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/01e312ce-f1f1–11e1-bba3–
00144feabdc0.html#axzz28U0XxHn0.   
 
Trent, Packard C. “An Evaluation of the Arctic – Will It Become an Area of Cooperation 
or Conflict?” Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011.   
 
Truman, Harry S. Proclamation 2667.  “Policy of the United States with Respect to the 
Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf.”  10 
Federal Register 12,305 (September 28, 1945). 
 
United Nations.  “Agreement on Arctic Cooperation.”  January 11, 1988.  
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%201852/volume-1852-i-
31529-english.pdf.   
 120 
———.  “Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics on the Maritime Boundary.”  June 1, 1990.  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREA
TIES/USA-RUS1990MB.PDF.   
 
———.  “Charter of the United Nations.” Chapter VII, Article 51. June 26, 1945.  
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/intro.shtml.   
 
———.  “Declarations and Statements under Articles 287, 298 and 310 of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas.”  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.ht
m.   
 
———.  “The Territorial Sea Geographical Co-ordinates (Area 7) Order.”  September 
10, 1985.  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CAN_
1985_Order.pdf.   
 
———.  “Treaty between the Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation 
Concerning Maritime Delimitation and Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the 
Arctic Ocean.”  September 15, 2010.   
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/TREA
TIES/NOR-RUS2010.PDF.   
 
———.  “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.”  November 19, 1990.  
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202443/v2443.pdf.   
 
———.  “United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.”  December 10, 1982.  
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.   
 
U.S. Coast Guard.  “Daily Chronology of Coast Guard History.”  
http://www.uscg.mil/history/Chron/Chronology_Aug.asp.   
 
U.S. Department of State.  “Limits in the Seas, No. 112: United States Responses to 
Excessive Maritime Claims.”  March 9, 1992.  
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/58381.pdf.   
 
U.S. Geological Survey.  “90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of 
Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic.”  July 23, 2008.  






U.S. Government Accountability Office.  “Coast Guard: Observations on Arctic 
Requirements, Icebreakers, and Coordination with Stakeholders.”  Testimony 
Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives. 
December 1, 2011.  http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/586574.pdf.   
 
U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations (PNTR) Status for Russia and U.S.-Russian Economic Ties, by William 
H. Cooper. CRS Report RS21123. Washington, DC: Office of Congressional 
Information and Publishing, June 15, 2012.  
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS21123.pdf.   
 
U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Convention on the Law of the Sea. S. 
Exec. Rept. 110–9 (2007). 
 
UPI.com.  “Canada Goes Ahead with Arctic Patrol Ships.”  July 25, 2011.  
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/07/25/Canada-goes-
ahead-with-Arctic-patrol-ships/UPI-40851311626012/.   
 
Vasilyeva, Nataliya.  “Russia, Canada in Rivalry over Arctic Resources.”  Associated 
Press, September 16, 2010.  
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/sep/16/russia-canada-in-rivalry-over-
arctic-resources/.   
 
Whipple, Tom.  “Peak Oil Review – September 5.”  Energy Bulletin, ASPO-USA, 
September 5, 2011.  http://www.energybulletin.net/print/58771.   
 
“Whose Hans?” Canadian Geographic Enterprises (2005), 
http://www.canadiangeographic.ca/hansIsland/default.asp.   
 
Yakovleva, Yana.  “Medvedev’s Battle against Legal Nihilism.”  The St. Petersberg 
Times, January 26, 2010.  http://www.sptimes.ru/story/30693.   
 
Young, Oran R.  “Canada and the United States in the Arctic: Testing the ‘Special 
Relationship.’”  Northern Perspectives 15, No. 2 (May–June 1987).  
http://www.carc.org/pubs/v15no2/2.htm.   
 
Zyśk, Katarzyna.  “Russia and the High North: Security and Defense Perspectives.”  In 
Security Perspectives in the High North: Geostrategic Thaw or Freeze?  NDC 
Forum Paper 7, edited by Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, 
102–129. Rome: NATO Defense College, 2009.   
 
 122 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 123 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
3. NORAD-USNORTHCOM/J2 
 Attn: RDML Brett Heimbigner, USN, Director of Intelligence 
Attn: CDR Michael Lupow, USCG (Ret.), Chief, Arctic Branch 
 Peterson AFB 
 
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff/J28 
 Attn: Col. William Gray 




5. Joint Chiefs of Staff/J8 
 Attn: Mr. Thomas Allen 
 The Pentagon 
 Washington, DC 
 
6. Chief of Naval Operations, OPNAV N2/N6I 
 Attn: RDML Norm Hayes 
 Attn: RDML Matt Kohler 
 The Pentagon 
 Washington, DC 
